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THE LEGAL ORIGIN AND NATURE OF INDIAN
HOUSING AUTHORITIES AND THE HUD INDIAN
HOUSING PROGRAMS
Mark K. Ulmer*
Introduction
In order to efficiently transform federal assistance into decent, safe,
and sanitary homes for American Indians on Indian reservations, the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) established
and presently regulates a system whereby financial and technical
assistance is provided to local Indian housing authorities (IHAs).
An IHA may be created by tribal governmental action or pursuant
to state statute; in either situation, the IHA is vested generally
with the authority to administer and supervise housing programs
within areas of its jurisdiction.
First, the focus of this article is to describe the legal origin of
the HUD Indian housing program since its inception in 1962. Sec-
ond, the article also seeks to analyze the legal nature of IHAs,
both tribally created and created pursuant to state law.
It is noted that the vast majority of case law involving IHAs
is construction litigation; one of the primary responsibilities of
IHAs is to oversee the development phase of their housing pro-
jects, including the solicitation of bids from potential prime con-
tractors (both Indian and non-Indian), award of the construction
contract, actual construction of housing units, and readying those
units for Indian home buyers or tenants previously selected by
the IHA. As is common to the construction industry as a whole,
disputes frequently develop between the owner (the IHA) and the
prime (general) contractor. Therefore, it is by analyzing the
available case law involving tribally created IHAs in construction
settings that one can best interpret the legal nature of an IHA.
Finally, two independent but somewhat related issues concerning
tribally created IHAs are consistently raised that remain basic
hurdles to a decision by the respective court on the merits. The
first is in what situations, from a plain reading of the "sue or
be sued" clause contained within the Model Tribal Ordinance
Editor's Note: In March of 1988. the officers, staff, and Faculty Sponsor Professor
Joseph Rarick were saddened to learn of the untimely death of Mark Ulmer in an auto
accident. Some of us. along with Piofessor Rarick. had met Mr. Ulmer in Albuquerque
at the annual Federal Courts meeting only a short time before his death. We were im-
pressed with his quick intelligence and believed this young attorney would be a valuable
asset to our profession.
We extend our deepest sympathy to Mr. Ulmer's family and to his coworkers in HUD's
Denver office.
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creating the IHA, the IHA has sufficiently waived sovereign immu-
nity to be sued. The second is which courts, federal, state and/or
tribal, may have jurisdiction to entertain the matter; the unique
composition of a tribally created IHA has raised the issue of
whether it is a tribal departmcnt or division, a separate corpor-
ation, or a federal administrative agency.
I. Legal Origin of Indian Housing Authorities
The United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended (hereafter
Housing Act),' established the Low Rent Public Housing Program
to assist the several states in remedying the unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions facing low- to moderate-income persons and
to "vest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount
of responsibility in the administration of their programs." 2 The
national housing policy, first declared by Congress in 1949, is to
provide "decent homes and [a] suitable living environment for
every American family";' this policy has been reaffirmed by Con-
gress.' The Housing Act authorizes the Secretary of HUD to make
loans and annual contributions to public housing agencies (in-
cluding local housing authorities) to assist in the development and
acquisition of low-rent housing projects and in maintaining the
low-rent character of such projects.'
Although the Housing Act provided the statutory basis for hous-
ing programs on Indian reservations, HUD did not initiate such
programs until 1962.6 It was not until this time that HUD adminis-
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1404a-1440 (197S and Supp. II1 1985).
2. Id. § 1437 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 42 U.S.C. § 1402(13) (1982) defines
the term "Authority" as meaning the United States Housing Authority. This, in turn,
is more commonly known as the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The
Housing Act authorizes the Secretary of HUD to make contributions to public housing
agencies. Id. § 1437c(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A public housing agency is defined to
include any state. Id. § 1437a(b)(6) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). Since the definition of "state"
includes Indian tribes, bands, and groups, Id. § 1437a(b)(7) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). an
Indian tribe or group is generally eligible for housing funds.
3. Id. § 1441 (1982).
4. See id. § 1441a (1982).
5, Id, § 1437c(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1985). See supra note 1.
6. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS. 94TH CONG.. Ist SESS.,
STAFF REPORT ON THE INDIAN HOUSING EFFORT IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED
APPENDICES 3 (Comm. Print 1975) fhereinafter REPORT); Low Rent Housingfor Indian Tribes
on Indian Reservations, Marie C. McGuire to Central Office Division and Branch Heads
and Regional Directors (1962). reprinted in REPORT. at 213; Low Rent Housing on Indian
Reservations Covered by Pubhc Law 280, Joseph Burstein to PHA Commissioner (July
19, 1962). reprinted in REPORT, at 217
[Vol. 13
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tratively determined that Indian tribes had the legal authority to
establish, pursuant to tribal law, the tribal housing authorities that
could develop and operate low-rent housing projects in areas sub-
ject to tribal jurisdiction.
Subsequent federal legislative amendments to the Housing Act
in 1965," 1968,' and 1974' emphasize and further define HUD's
authority and responsibility for assistance to low-income families
in areas subject to tribal jurisdiction. In 1964, HUD, in cooperation
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), established the Mutual
Help Homeownership Program ("Old" Mutual Help Program)'"
as an alternative to the Low Rent Program" initiated several
months earlier. In contrast to the Low Rent Program, which still
involves the development and administration of rented dwellings
for Indian participants, the "Old" Mutual Help Program sought
to provide an opportunity for Indian homeownership that would
be "a strong incentive for participants to aid in the building and
maintenance of their own homes."' 2 These two programs were
followed in 1968 by a second homeownership program, the Turn-
key IIl Homeownership Program," which was later made applica-
ble to the Indian housing programs.
The Modernization Program also was introduced by HUD in
1968." This program specifically provides for the rehabilitation
of outmoded or deteriorated housing. It was established to improve
low-rent housing projects by: (a) correcting extensive physical
deterioration of sites, structures, or equipment; (b) replacing out-
moded equipment or structures; and (c) improving :he grounds,
structures, or equipment by alteration or providing additional struc-
tures or equipment." The Modernization Program, applicable to
7 42 U.S C. § 3535(d) (1982).
8. Id. § 1467. 1468. 14.68a (1982)
9. Id. § 1437c(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also id. § 1437g(a)(l) (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
10. REPORT. supra note 6. at 4-5. See PHA Mutual Help Housing for Indians. Marie
C McGuire to all Public Housing Administration Regional Directors (Dec. 5. 1962).
reprinted in REPORT. supra note 6. at 221; PHA Mutual-Help Housing Program in Con-
.lunction with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Joseph Burstein to PHA Commissioner (Nov.
30. 1962), reprinted in REPORT. supra. at 222.
II See supra note 6
12 REPORT. supra note 6, at 5.
13 Id. at 6.7 See 39 Fed. Reg. 10.966 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R §§ 804.101-.309
(1974)). redesignated at 40 Fed. Reg. 15.580 (1975); 49 Fed. Reg. 6.714 (1984).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1437L (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985).
15 Id
No. 21
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all HUD Indian housing programs, was redesignated the Compre-
hensive Improvement Assistance Program (ClAP) in 1980." '
In 1976 a third homeownership program, the Mutual Help
Homeownership and Opportunity Program ("New" Mutual Help
Program)," was established to replace the "Old" Mutual Help
Program. HUD promulgated separate regulations at this time to
govern generally the Low Rent and "New" Mutual Help pro-
grams and "Old" Mutual Help units that have been converted
to "New" Mutual Help pursuant to the regulations." The Interim
16. 47 Fed. Reg. 22,315 (1982), redesignated at 49 Fed. Reg. 6,714 (1984). The ClAP
is applicable to all HUD Indian housing programs See 51 Fed. Reg. 979 (1986) (proposed
Jan 9. 1986).
17 41 Fed. Reg. 10,151 (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 805.101-.430) (1976)). See
44 Fed. Reg. 5a.212 (1979).
18. Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 905. applies to the "'New"
Mutual Help Program and -'Old" Mutual Help units which have been converted to the
-New" Mutual Help Program pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 905.428 (1986). See 24 C.F.R.
§ 905,401 (1986). Part 905. subparts "A" (General). "B" (Development) and "'C" (Opera-
tions) appl) to the Low Rent Program
It also is clear that title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations, part 905. subpart
"A" is applicable to the "Old" Mutual Help Program. What has not been clearly determined
by administrative action is the applicabilit, of subpart "C" (Operation) to the "Old"
Mutual Help Program. HUD intended subpart -C- to govern certain aspects of this pro-
gram. not only because no new "Old" Mutual Help projects would be approved after
March 9. 1976, but all "Old" Mutual Help projects "4ould necessarily be in the "operation"
or "management" phase as of that date or soon thereafter.
Additional HUD regulations are binding upon all Indian housing programs. These
regulatory provisions include the following: "Definition of Family and Other Related Terms;
Occupancy by Single Persons" (24 C.F.R §§ 912 -. 4 (1986)). "Definition of Income.
Income Limits, Rent, and Reexamination of Famil, Income for the Public Housing and
Indian Housing Programs" (24 C.F R §§ 913.101- 110 (1986)), "PHA-Owned or Leased
Projects-Maintenance and Operation" (subpans "C" and "D"), 24 C.F.R. §§ 965.301-.410
(1986). and subparts "F" and "G." 24 C.F.R. § 965.501-.605 (1986)). "PHA-Owned
Projects-Personnel Policies and Compensation" (24 C.F.R. §§ 967.301-.309 (1986)). "Com-
pr.:hensive Improvement Assistance Program" (24 C F.R. §§ 968.1-.18 (1986). See supra
notes 14-16. "PHA-Owned Projects-Continued Operation as Low-Income Housing After
Completion of Debt Service" (24 C.F.R. §§ 969 101-.107 (1986))." "Public Housing Program:
Demolition or Disposition of Public Housing Programs" (24 C+F.R. §§ 970.1-. 11 (1986)).
and "Waiver Authority" (24 C.F.R. § 999.101 (1986)). "PHA-Owned or Leased Projects-
Maintenance and Operation," subpart "E" (24 C.F.R §§ 965A70-.480 (1986)) applies
only to the Turnkey Ill and Low Rent Programs; "Annual Contributions for Operating
Subsidy' (24 C.F.R. §§ 990.101. 116 (1986). 50 Fed. Reg. 52.280 (1985) applies only to
the Lo'4 Rent Program.
The section 8 Housing Assistance Payments Program v also applicable to the Indian
housing programs, but pragmatically is applicable onl, to existing housing on the reser'.a-
tions 24 C.F R. § 905 103(c) (1986)
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
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Indian Housing Handbook also was drafted and implemented by
HUD to provide guidance to IHAs in administering their housing
programs. "
Today the "Old" Mutual Help Program is governed primarily
by an internal HUD Handbook2" and the terms and conditions
provided in the Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreements executed
between the IHA and the individual participants. 2 ' No new Indian
housing projects pursuant to the "Old" Mutual Help Program
have been constructed or otherwise approved since March 1976.
Although the BIA's primary involvement in the Indian housing
field concerns tribal trust land issues, it established the Housing
Improvement Program (HIP) in 1965 to assist Indian families with
exceptionally low incomes or no incomes at all.22 Through HIP,
the BIA provides grants for repairs, major rehabilitation, down
payments, and some new housing construction to Indian people
who are unable to obtain it from any other source. Today this
program focuses mainly on grants for home rehabilitation and
repair. Additionally, in 1976 the BIA, HUD, and the Indian Health
Service entered into a tripartite interdepartmental agreement on In-
dian Housing to ensure increased coordination between the three
federal agencies in providing for housing and related services on
Indian reservations. 2
The Housing Act authorizes HUD to process loans and annual
contributions to IHAs through the use of an Annual Contributions
Contract (ACC) to subsidize the development and administration
of its Indian housing programs.' " The ACC is a contractual agree-
ment between HUD and the IHA; it pledges annual contributions
(federal funds) to back notes or bonds issued by the IHA to fund
all phases of the housing project. Typically, each IHA will adminis-
ter projects under three ACCs; an ACC for rental housing, 2 an
19. HUD Handbook 7-440.1 (Mar. 1976).
20. Mutual Help Housing Manual 'Sept. 1964).
21 Mutual Help and Occupancy Agreement. Form HUD-53044 (July 1967) (formerly
form PHA-3044)
22 40 Fed Reg. 19.195 (1975). redesignated at 40 Fed. Reg. 44,543 (1975). and 47 Fed.
Reg 13.327 (1982). 25 C F R. § 256 (1986). See REPORr, supra note 6. at 7-8.
2"1 243 C.F.R. part 905, subpart B. app. 1 (1986). See 24 C.F.R. §§ 905 104. 905.202
and 905 208 (1986).
2-1 See supral note 5
25 Low Rent Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract. Form HUD-53010B (No%,
1969) and Form HUD-53011 (Nov 1969)
No. 2]
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ACC for the "Old" Mutual Help Program, 2 ' and an ACC for
the "New" Mutual Help Program.2
HUD regulations require that an IHA be established for the
Indian tribe to take advantage of the Indian housing program. 2'
An IHA may be created either by properly conducted tribal govern-
ment action or p,irsuant to the applicable state law of the state
where the Indian tribe or reservation is located.2" The IHA also
must demonstrate administrative and financial capability to per-
form these responsibilities as a prerequisite to HUD approval for
new housing projects.3 0
II. The Legal Nature of Indian Housing Authorities
Concerning federal housing programs for American Indians,
it is apparent that HUD is subject to traditional notions of tribal
sovereignty and the power of tribal governments to generally enact
laws for the benefit of and regulate the activities of tribal members
residing on Indian reservations. However, Indian housing is not
solely an internal tribal matter. HUD has fully evidenced an intent
to maintain partial control over the administration of housing pro-
jects through promulgated regulations and continuing contractual
relations with each IHA, whether state or tribally created. In addi-
tion, HUD has adopted and applied current federal policy to its
Indian housing programs by granting each IHA the authority to
manage federal funding and accept primary responsibility for the
administration of the IHA's housing programs.'
26. Annual Contributions Contract For Mutual-Help Projects. Form HUD-53040 (June
1967) (formerly Form PHA.3040) and Form HUD-53041 (September 1963) (formerly Form
HUD-3041)
27 Mutual Help Homeownership Opportunity Program Annual Contributions Con-
tract. Form HUD-53040 (March 1976) and Form HUD-53041 (March 1976). See Mutual
Help and Occupancy Agreement. Form HUD-53056 (March 1976).
28, 24 C.F.R. §§ 905-101. 905.102. 905.108. 905.109 (1986).
29. Id § 905 108
30. Id. § 905.207
31. Contrary to th- 'termination- policy in effect during the 1950s and early 1960s.
it is clear that current federal executive and legislative policy fa,,or the concept of inde-
pendent sovereign Indtan nations. Pursuant to its plenary authority, Congress has repeatedly
passed legislation (especially during the period 1968 to 1982) emphastzing tribal autonomy,
self-government. and the development of Indian reservatior. economies. These statutes
include the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 25 u.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1341 (1983). the Indian
Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-154 (1983). the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 450-458 (1983), the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (1983). and the Indian Mineral Development
Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2108 (1983). See Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Reservation. 447 U.S. 135. 155-57 (1980) (the Supreme Court recognizes
[Vol. 13
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It is well settled that the federal trust relationship, the judicially
created doctrine that establishes and defines the federal govern-
ment's legal responsibilities as trustee and guardian toward Indians
this congressional concern of fostering tribal self-government and economic development).
Evidence of current congressional policy is manifest within the language of the preamble
of the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Edfication Assistance Act, in which Congress
"recognizes the obligation of the United States to respond to the strong expression of
the !ndian people for self-determination by assuring maximum Indian participation in
the direction of educational as well as other Federal services to Indian communities."
25 U.S.C.A. § 450a (1983).
President Reagan has reaffirmed President Nixon's 1970 message to Congress. see
6 Pres. Doc. 894 (1970). by announcing a policy of "removing the obstacles to self-
government" and "creating a more favorable environment for the development of healthy
reservation economies." President's Statement on Indian Policy, 19 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 98 (Jan. 24. 1983). Reagan stressed the need to "reaffirm dealing with Indian tribes
on a government-to-government basis and to pursue the policy of self-government for
Indtan tribes without threatening termination." Id. See also Report and Recommendations
to the President of the United States, Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation
Economies, Nov. 1984; S. 856, 98th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1983). which provides for creation
of a comprehensive Indian housing program to be consolidated solely within the BIA.
The central focus concerning federal Indian housing programs has been the relationship
between the federal government, through HUD, the BIA and Indian Health Service (IHS),
and the various IHAs. The Report describes some of the problems faced by IHAs during
the early 1970s in administering their housing programs:
Whereas non-Indiar, governments (usually a county or municipality) may need to work
only with one Federal agency (HUD), tribal governments must work not only with
HUD. but also with the BIA for the roads and site work to be incorporated into the
housing project, and then again with IHS. which is responsible for water and sewer
facilities servicing the project. . -.
Admittedly. constructing housing units and providing necessary related services
is. by nature, a complex process. Any housing authority. Indian or non-Indian. must
necessarily endure some "red tape" before units can be financed, constructed and
ecn;ually occupied. However, the administration of the Indian housing programs seems
to be plagued with an inordinate amount of delay and lack of coordination. The reason
for this is primarily two-fold. First, tribal housing authorities must work exclusively
through Federal agencies and sub-agencies. This forces the tribal housing authority
to work through the Federal bureaucracy at every turn. Secondly, many tribal housing
authorities are understaffed and their members inadequately trained and underpaid.
Few come to the housing authority with the skills and expertise necessary to cope effec-
tively with the procedures and regulations of the several Federal agencies involved.
The net result of these factors, and others suggested above, is a cumbersome process
with 'hich few tribal housing authorities are able to contend.
RFl'4)RT. supra note 6, at 14-15. See Report of the Comptroller General to the 90th Congress,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) (entitled "Slow Progress in Eliminating Substandard Indian
Housing")
However, paralleling the current policy endorsed by the Reagan administration, this
relanionship has noticeably improved. See also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
-49. 72 n.32 (1978) (the Supreme Court specifically identified the cautiousness federal courts
must exert before rushing to "create causes of action that would intrude" on delicate
matters of internal tribal concern).
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and Indian tribes as beneficiaries, includes Indian housing.,
Although the trust doctrine must be based upon a federal statute
to be invoked, the extent of the doctrine is limited only by common
law trust principles." The broad scope of this doctrine extends
to off-reservation Indian housing programs as well as those within
reservation boundaries."
It is also well settled that HUD is not barred by the equal protec-
tion clause of the Constitution or civil rights statutes from pro-
viding financial assistance approved under federal or state
statutes." Thus, so long as an expression of legislative intent is
manifest, an Indian preference program will fall within the pro-
tection of the trust doctrine. 6
Indian Housing Authorities Created By Tribal Action
Tribal Sovereignty in General
The unique legal status of North American Indian tribes,
although predating the signing of the United States Constitution,
32. St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd. v. Reynolds, 546 F. Supp. 1408. 1411 (D. Minn.
1983). See also Eric v. Secretary of HUD. 464 F. Supp. 44 (D. Alaska 1978).
33 Eric. 464 F. Supp. at 49. See also United States v. Mason. 412 U.S. 391. 398
(1973): Seminole Nation v. United States. 316 U.S. 286. 296-97 (1942).
34. St Paul Intertrtbal Housing Bd_. 564 F. Supp. at 1414. The federal trust rela-
tionship was first established in the intial set of Native American cases before the Supreme
Court This trust relationship addresses the needs of the American Indian people and
the legal obligation of the federal goernment to provide services for Indian people, both
on and off the reser'aton. The federal courts use the terms "fiduciary" and "trust**
relationship interchangeably, but there appears to be a difference in the degree of obligation
placed upon the federal government.
Congress alone, pursuant to its plenary power. has the authority and the power to
determine the manner in which the guardianship of the United States over Indians shall
be carried out and in legislating for their protection. See Minnesota %. United States.
305 U.S. 382 (1938): United States %. Kagama. 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886). For a discussion
of the broad applicability of the federal trust doctrine to Indian housing program, see
St Paul Intertribal Housing Bd.. 564 F. Supp. at 1413-14.
35 Alaska Chapter, Ass'n Gen'[ Contrs. of Am.. Inc. v. Pierce. 694 F2d 1162 (9th
Cir 1982). applying the rule et.iablished in Morton v. Mancart. 417 U.S, 535 (1974), in
upholding Indian preference in the selection ef prime contractors for Indian housing pro-
jects. See also St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd.. 564 F. Supp. 1408 (D_ Minn. 1983)
(upholding an urban Indian housing board's Indian preference procedure in the selection
of tenants for housing it administered).
36 St. Paul Iniertribal llousing Bd.. 564 F. Supp. at 1411. HUD has specifically
mandated that Itdian preference policies apply to programs administered by state and
tribal IHAs. See 51 Fed- Reg. 43.734 (1986) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. §§ 905.106 and
905,204.). applicable to Indian housing projects advertised on or after Mar. 15. 1987; 24
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
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was not recognized by the United States Supreme Court until
1831. ' However, any legal analysis of Indians and Indian tribes
must focus upon the concepts of tribal sovereignty, federal-state
relations, and the nature of the asserted claim. The Constitution
directly recognizes tribal sovereignty in two separate places. First
of all, it specifically grants Congress the authority or plenary power
to regulate affairs involving Indian commerce." Second, the Consti-
tution also gives Congress, through the President, the right to enter
into treaties with the individual tribes, pursuant to the treaty and
supremacy clauses.' 9
Indian tribes have long been recognized as separate sovereign
entities, possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.' These attributes necessarily include
the authority to regulate their internal and social affairs, legislate
their own substantive law, and enforce that law in their own
forums." The powers of tribal government are not powers granted
by express acts of Congress but are inherent powers of a limited
sovereignty that have never been extinguished. 2
Tribal sovereignty is not, however, absolute; it is subject to
limitation by specific treaty provisions," by statute enacted by
C F R N 905,106, 905 204. 905.309 (1986). and 49 Fed. Reg. 37,749 (1984) (HUD's state-
meni of polic) concerning its Indian preference regulations).
37 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 30 U.S (5 Pet ) I (1831). See also Worcester v.
Georgia. 11 U S (6 Pei.) 515 (1832): Johnson v. MI'ntosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823)
38. U-S CoNs. art I. § 8. cl. 3. The applicable clause states: "The Congress shall
have Power to . regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.
and with the Indian Tribes."
39. Id . art. II. § 2. cl 2 and art. VI. The treaty-making power is shared by both
the President and the Senate. who must ratifs the treaty b a two-thirds' vote. Under
the supremacy clause. "all Treaties made. or which shall be made. under the Authoriiv
ol the Unted States. shall be the supreme Law of the Land: and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrars notw.ithstanding.'"
40. United States v. Wheeler. .135 U.S. 313. 323 (1978). See Bibbitt Ford. Inc. '..
,,asalo Indian Tribe. 710 F,2d 587. 591 (9th Cir. 1983). cert. denied. 466 U.S. 926 (1984).
41 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55-66+
42 Id See Washington v. Conlederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation. 447 U.S,
131 11980): \orcester v. Georgia. 31 U.S. (6 Pei.) 515 (1832).
413 Wlheeler. .135 U S. at 323 (Congress has the unilateral power to cancel rights for-
mall, established b% an Indian treaty). In addition, the major premise coz.,-erning Indian
treaties is that all right, stated iherein are not a grant of rights and privileges to the tribe.
but rather a relinquishment of such rights by the tribe, with their consent. Central Mach
Co %. -*ri2ona Tax Comm'n. 448 U.S 160 (1980): United States v. Winans. 198 U.S
371 (1905).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
Congress pursuant to its plenary power," by portions of the Consti-
tution explicitly binding on the tribes,45 andl by implication due
to the tribes' "dependent" status."
One element of tribal sovereignty is the power to exercise some
form of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized tribal courts as "ap-
propriate fo-ums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting
important personal and property interests of both Indians and
non-Indians.'"4  The power to exercise tribal civil authority over
non-Indians derives not only from the tribe's inherent powers neces-
sary for self-government and management but also from the power
to exclude nonmembers from tribal land." Thus a tribe has the
power "to place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or
on reservation conduct,... non-members who [enter] the jurisdic-
tion of the tribe [remain] subject to the risk that the tribe will
later exercise [this] sovereign power.''1" This limited authority over
nonmembers does not arise unless and until the nonmember invokes
the tribal jurisdiction by entering tribal lands or by conducting
business with the tribe.1'
The limits of tribal civil authority over non-Indians have not
been precisely determined; however, recent Supreme Court decisions
involving tribal taxation of non-Indian entities provide significant
guidance." It is equally clear that each tribe "may regulate, through
44. Wheeler. 435 U.S. at 323. See also Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 56. 72 (Con
,re%.,s has the plenary authority to limit, modify. or eliminate the powers of local self
government that tribes otherwise possess, but Congress' intent to do so must be clear,.
e-'pressed).
45 Trans-Canada Enterp.. Ltd. v. Muckelshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.,d 474. 476.477
19th Cit. 1980).
46. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (the Indian tribes "incorporation within the territory
of the United States. and their acceptance of its protection. necessarily divested them of
%ome aspects of the sovereignty tvhich they had previously exercised"). See Babbitt Ford.
710 F.2d at 591 nn.3-6.
47. Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation. 709 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1983). cert denied.
467 U.S. 1214 (1984), quoting Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 65.
48. Merrion ,,. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 455 U.S. 130. 141-44 (1982): Montana '. United
States. 450 U.S. 544, 565 t1981); Babbitt Ford, 710 F.2d at 592. For a discussion of tvo
differing approaches employed by the Supreme Court addressing this issue. see Confederated
Salih & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen. 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 459 U S 977
11982)
49. Merrion. 455 U.S. at 144-45.
50 Id at 142; Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
51 Thus, the Supreme Court has recently been confronted with the issues of whether
an Indian tribe has the power to regulate and ta the sale of liquor sold on the reservation
iRice v. Rehner. 463 U.S, 713 (1983); United States v Mazurie. 491 U.S 544 (1975)):
(Vol. 13
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taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members,
through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrange-
ments."'" Lower federal courts have upheld the authority of tribes
io regulate the affairs of non-Indians who have sufficiently infringed
upon tribal interests to warrant protection of those interests."
The Legal Nature of a Tribally Created Indian Housing Authority
Where an Indian tribe has an established governing body with
sufficient powers of self-government and governmental police
power to promote the general welfare within its reservation bound-
aries, the tribal governing body may perform the legal functions
otherwise performed by a state legislature or local government
with regard to HUD-assisted low-income housing.
HUD regulations specifically provide that such a governing body
may create an IHA;" in every instance where a tribal government
the power to tax the sale of cigarettes to Indians or otherwise tax a non-Indian business
located on the reservation (Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation.
447 U.S. 134 01980)). the power to impose a severance tax on oil and gas production
by non-Indian lessees (Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 455 U.S. 130 (1982)). and
whether BIA approval is necessary before an Indian tribe may impose a tax upon lease-
hold interests in tribal lands and receipts resulting from them (Kerr-McGee Corp. ,
Navajo Indian Tribe. 471 U.S- 195 (1985)). See National Farmers' Union Ins. Co v
Crow Tribe. 471 U.S 845 n 12 (1915).
52 Montana. 450 U S. at 564-65.
53 See -X & A Concrete. Inc v. White Mountain ApaLbe Tribe. 781 F.2d 1411 (9th
ir ). cert denied. 106 S. Ci. 2008 I ,oj tNinth Circu:a affirms lower court's dismissal
of construction company's claims against the tribe for deprivation of civil rights and pendent
state claims due to lack of jurisdiction, based on National Farmers' Union Ins. Co. v
Crow Tribe, 471 U S. 845 (1985); Babbit Ford. Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe.
710 I- 2d 587. 591 (9th Cir 1983). cert. denied. 466 U.S. 926 (1984) (the Navajo Tribe'%
exercise ot civil jurisdiction over non-Indians who were repossessing an automobile, pur-
chased off the reservation. is not within that part of the sovereignty which the Indians
implicitly lost b. virtue of their dependent status); Cardin v. De La Cruz. 671 F 2d 363
(9th Cir.). cert denied. 439 U.S. 967 (1982) (the tribe retained the inherent sovereign
power to impose its health, building, and safety regulations on a non-Indian's business.
which was located on fee land within the exterior boundaries of the reservation). Confeder
ated Salish & Kootenai Tribes ., Namen. 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir ). cert. denied. 459 U.S
977 (1982) (Ninth Circuit upheld the tribe's right to regulate federal common law riparian
rights of non-Indians who owned reservation land to which the tribes had beneficial title):
Knight . Shostione & Arapahoe Indian Tribes. 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1981) (court held
a%, ahd the exercise of tribal power zoning regulation thai affected fee land owned b,
non-Indians located within reservation boundaries)
54 24 C-F R. §§ 905 108(a) and 905.109 (1986)
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does so, the applicable tribal ordinance must follow the exact for-
mat prescribed by HUD." The provisions of this ordinance are
similar in substance and in form to a corporate set of bylaws. 6
The format of the Model Tribal Ordinance has been virtually un-
changed since HUD first introduced it in 1962. Certain sections
of the Ordinance may be altered by the tribe on its own motion;
the majority of the provisions, however, require HUD approval
before they can be amended."
HUD shall not enter into an undertaking for assistance to an
IHA formed by tribal ordinance unless the ordinance has been
submitted to HUD for approval, accompanied by evidence that
the tribal government's enactment of the ordinance has either been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior (through the B1A) or
that the Secretary has reviewed the ordinance and has not objected
to it; documentation enumerated in the HUD regulations is also
required.'
It is not necessary that the tribe creating the IHA be organized
under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA),' 9 that it have
55. Id.
56. Id § 905, subpart A. app. I (1986) (hereinafter Ordinance].
57 Id.. and 24 C.F.R. § 905.109 (1986). The footnotes to the Ordinance read as follows:
'Article I ma) be modified as deemed appropriate.
'Article IV. section I(a). paragraphs (I). (2) and (3) may be modified. Fot example
the number of board members ma', be more or less than five: the appointments may
be made by the elected head of the tribal government. rather than the Council. The
IHA ma% be made a department or division of the tribal government, membership
on the Board may be limited to those ,ho arc members of the tribe, or to those vho
are nonmembers of the Council. or to a certain number of any category.
'Article IV, section I(b) mas be modified to conform to change, in Article IV.
section I(a). and as o the length of the term ol membership-
'Article IV. section l(c) may be modified as to the manner o appointment of the
Chairman. For example, it may provide for appointment by the Board members or
by the elected head of the tribal government. This paragraph may also be modified
as to the manner of appointment of the other officials
'Article IV, section I(d) may be modified, but adequate safeguards against arbitrary
removal shall be included
'Article IV. section I(f) mas be modified it deemed appropriate %here the full Board
cons,, of more than 5 members.
'Article VIll. section (f) may be modified to insert the name of the appropriate
court, or it ma% be deleted where it is demonstrated to HUI) thai the jurisdiction
for evictions is ,ested in other than tribal courts (e g.. State courts or 'ourts of Indian
Ofenses).
is 24. C.F.R. { 905.109 (1986).
59 25 U.S.C §§ 461-479 (1983 and Supp I1 1985). See Babbut.Ford. 710 F.2d
at 599 (Indian tribes are not required to adopt a constitution pursuant to the IRA before
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
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previously enacted a tribal constitution and bylaws, or that it even
be federally recognized; HUD will consider many factors in deter-
mining whether a tribal government retains sufficient powers of
self-government to create an IHA.6 °
No one factor is compelling when HUD makes this factual deter-
mination. The Trenton Indian Housing Authority in North Dakota,
for example, administers Indian housing programs without the
benefit of an Indian reservation. Similarly, the Joint Business
Council of the Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes of the Wind River
Indian Reservation, Wyoming, created the HUD-approved Wind
River Housing Authority without the benefit of a joint tribal consti-
tution or oy laws. It is clear, however, that the majority of IHAs
have been created pursuant to properly enacted tribal ordinances. 6'
HUD regulations require that tribal ordinances enacted before
March 9, 1976, that do not conform to the required provisions
of this form, must be amended as soon as possible thereafter to bring
them into compliance. 6 Additionally, beginning January 1, 1977,
no contract or amendment providing any additional commitment for
HUD financial assistance shall be entered into unless such con-
forming amendments have been enacted.6"
exercising civil jurisdiction oser non-Indians on the resersation). See ulso F. COHEN. HAND-
tooK oF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 231-32 (R- StriclIand ed. 1982).
60. Among the factors that HUD will consider in determining %,hether a tribal go,,ern-
ment retains sufficient powers of self-goernment to create an IHA includes whether it has.
I) been of ficiallv denominated a tribe pursuant to the IRA or otherwise recognized
b' the Federal government as eligible for basic Federal ser,6ices, whether b) act of
Congress or executive order:
2) enacted a tribal constitution and b,-laws vshich have obtained BIA approval
pursuant to 25 U S.C.A. § 81 (1983) and 25 CFR. t§ 81-83 (1986);
3) had treat% relations '%ith the United States.
4) been treated as haing collective rights in tribal lands or funds, even though
not expressl:, designated a tribe;
5) been treated as a tribe or band by other Indian tribes:
6) eercised political authority over its members, through a tribal council or other
distinct and domestic form of government.
7) maintained an uninterrupted existence as a united community, isolated for the
mo t part fiom non-Indian infiltration, and.
8) maintained a land base for a prolonged period of time.
F CoHiEN. 5upra note 59. at 13-16; Memo. Sol. Int Feb. 8. 1937 (Mole Lake Band of
Chippevas). Monova % United States. 180 U.S 261. 266 (1901).
61 Currentl, there are approximately 131 tcbally cre..:t- I Indian housing authorities
that tdminister housing program, on their respective reservations. Altogether. there are
approximatel, 172 Indian housing authorities pre,,entl in the United States.
62 24 C I R , 905 109(d) (1986).
63 Id 905 109(e)
No. 21
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
AMERICAN INDIA N LA W REVIEW
The Model Tribal Ordinance creates a special relationship between
the tribal governing body and the IHA. The IHA is established
as a separate public body, primarily so that the tribal government
is protected from the debts and obligations created when the IHA
borrows money to develop projects."' As the IHA is a separate
entity, the tribal government is not responsible for the day-to-day
supervision of the IHA's activities, nor is it responsible for the
IHA's legal obligations or debts.
The tribal government maintains a reasonable amount of control
over the activities of the IHA, though, by retaining the authority
to amend the tribal ordinance," to designate the members of the
board of commissione-s, 6 6 and the person who will serve as chair-
man, 61 to require regulor reports to be provided," and to reserve
the right to remove a member of the board for serious inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or misconduct in office. 9 The Ordinance notes
that there is a shortage of Jecent, safe, and sanitary low-income
housing that cannot be remedied through the operation of private
enterprise." The provision of adequate housing is expressly declared
to be a "governmental function of Tribal concern" to the tribal
council," and the property of the IHA is deemed to be "public
property used for essential public and governmental purposes" and
exempt from all taxes and special assessments of the tribe.' 2
Article II of the Ordinance lists the three primary purposes for
which each IHA was created: to remedy unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions on the reservation; to supply decent, safe, and
64. See id.. art. V. k 2 C"The Tribe shall not be liable for the debts or obligations
of the Authority"); art VI. § 2 ("Neither the commissioners of the Authority nor any
person executing the obligations shall be hable personally on the obligation., by reason
of issuance thereof'), art, VI. 3 ("The notes and other obligations of the Authority
shall not be a debt of the Tribe and the obligations shall so state on their face"); and
art. VI. & 7. which delineates generally the authority granted to the IHA to incur obligations.
65. See 24 C.FR § 905 109 (1986). supra note 57.
66. Ordinance. supra note 56. art. IV. § I (a)(2)
67 Id.. art. IV. 4 I(c).
68 Id § I(h). and art- VII. , 1
69- Id . art. IV. § Id) This section ma., be modified by subsequent tribal ordinance.
but any modification must include safeguards against arbitrary removal.
70 Id. art I. , I and 3
71 Id 4
72 Id. art. VII. 6 See alo art. N, Ill. § Ila) (the tribe agrees not to levy or impose
,ns real or personal property taxes or special assessments upon the IHA or its property)
and 42 U S-C . 1437d(d) (1981 and Supp Ill 1985): art. VII. § 4 (the obligations of
'he IHA are gisen the same legal effect as IHA-ossned property).
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sanitary housing for persons of low income; and to provide employ-
ment opportunities through the construction, repair, and operation
of low-income dwellings.
The Model Tribal Ordinance establishes the organizational struc-
ture, powers, and duties of the IHA. The board of commissioners,
typically consisting of five members, retain the authority to set
the policies the IHA will follow." The IHA also employs a staff,
headed by an executive director, which is responsible for the day-
to-day operation of the IlHA and for carrying out the policies
established by the board.
The powers of the IHA are set forth in article V, section 3
of the Mooel Tribal Ordinance. An examination of the twenty enum-
erated powers evidences the intent of the tribe and of HUD, which
drafted the ordinance, that the IHA would be a separate corporate
body with the freedom to contract with and conduct business trans-
actions with off-reservation entities. However, each IHA's initial,
and arguably most important, contractual relationship will be with
HUD. Upon the execution of an ACC, federal monies will become
available to fund IHA housing projects: these federal funds generally
are the sole source of Financial assistance provided to the IHAs
to construct and manage the projects.
Finally, article VIII states that the tribal government will
cooperate with its respective IHA in connection with the construc-
tion and management of housing on the reservation. Article VIII
is similar in nature to the cooperation agreements required of non-
Indian public housing authorities in dealing with their local govern-
ing bodies." The Model Tribal Ordinance also states that the tribe's
71 Id. art IV § l(a)(I).
74. Each IHA must execute cooperation agreements with each local governing body
that s.ill pro\,ide 'ater and sewer services and local cooperation Section 5(e) of the Housing
-\%t provide, as follows-
In recognition that there should be local determination of the need for lower income
houimg to meet needs not being adequately met by private enterprise-
(I) the Secretary shall not make any contract with a public housing agency for
preliminary loans (all of vhicl, shall be repaid out of any moneys which become
asailable to such agency for the development of the projects involved) for surveys
and planning in respect to any lower income housing projects (i) unless the govern-
ing bods of the locality involved has by resolution approved the application of
the public housing agency for such preliminary loan; and (ii) unless the public housing
agenc, has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Secretary that there is need for
such los'er income housing which is not being met by private enterprise; and
(2) the Secretary shall not make any contract for loans (other than preliminary
loa, or for annual contributions pursuant to this Act t:nless the governing body
No. 2)
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intent is to do any and all things necessary to secure the financial
aid or cooperation of the federal government in the undertaking,
construction, maintenance, or operation of the respective IHA's
projects and that no other tribal ordinance with iespect to the
acquisition, operation, or disposition of tribal propeity shall be
applicable to the IHA.11
of the localit' involved has entered into an agreement with the public housing agency
providing for the local cooperation required by the Secretary pursuant to this Act.
42 U.S.C. § 1437c(c) (1982 & Supp. II1 1985) (emphasis added).
Each Annual Contributions Contract entered into by HUD and an IHA also requires
that the IHA enter into cooperation agreements with the governing body of the locality.
See Low Rent Consolidated Annual Contributions Contract, Form HUD-53010B (Nov.
1969), § I. at I Annual Contributions Contract For Mutual-Help Projects. Form
HUD-53040 (June 1967) (formerly Form PHA-3040). § 1. at I: Mutual Help Homeowner-
ship Opportunity Program Annual Contributions Contract. Form HUD-53040 (Mar. 1976).
9§ 0 1, 0.6 and 0.7. at 8-9.
Where the local governing body is the respective tribal government, a tribally created
IHA does not have to enter into separate cooperation agreements because article Vill
of the ordinance is sufficient to fulfill this requirement. However, when the local govern-
ing body is a state-incorporated municipality, the IHA is required by federal statute and
by contract to enter into separate -ooperation agreements with the local governing body
(this also is the case where the IHA is created pursuant to state law).
The local cooperation required by the cooperation agreement form prescribed by HUD.
Form HUD-52481 (Nov. 1969). includes the following: exemption from real and personal
property taxes; the provision of the same public services and facilities to the project at
no cost to the IHA as are furnished at no cost to other housing units within the governing
bodvs jurisdiction (including, for example. police and fire protection); and the pro% ision
of water mains and storm and sanitary stwer mains to the project, for which normal
serices the IHA may make payments not to exceed those assessed private owners in the
jwsdiction
The standard cooperation agreement form may be modified with the approval of
The applicable HUD Regional Office, provided that all legal requirements are otherwise
met See Interim Indian Housing Handbook. Handbook 7440.1 (Mar. 1976) [hereafter
IHH]. ch 1. 1 1.3(d). at 1-13. For example, when a local governing body is unable to
make expenditures for any facilities or improvements required by the cooperation agreement.
and such facilities or improvements are not normally provided by the local governing
body but are the obligation of a private developer under local codes or established practice-.
the cooperation agreement may be amended accordingly.
A cooperation agreement may be for as large a program as the parties may agree
in. however. HUD will not approve applications for nevs or additional housing or enter
into Preliminary Loan Contracts or Annual Contributions Contracts (ACCs) for units
in a ,pecific locality where the number of units to be administered by the IHA exceeds
the number of units covered by the cooperation agreement with the local governing body
for that locality. See IHH. 1-3(d), at 1-13. An, cooperation agreement that is executed
by an IliA and its local governing body is subject to HUD approval. See IHH. 1i -3(d)(I)
and (2). at 14
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Tribal Department, Agency, or Corporation?
In DuBray v. Rosebud Housing Authority," the United States
District Court for the District of South Dakota determined that
the tribally created Rosebud Housing Authority was a "tribal agency,
to which the limitations of the United States Constitution do not
apply."' !n determining whether the IHA was a tribal agency
or a federal administrative agency, the court noted:
The Rosebud Housing Authority was established by the Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Council in the exercise of its powers of self-
government. The Rosebud Housing Authority operates in con-
nection with the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development in the operation and development of hous-
ing projects on the Rosebud Reservation. But this Court must
reject the Plaintiffs' claim that the RHA does not possess attri-
butes of tribal sovereignty and is sufficiently linked to HUD
that it may be considered an agency of the federal government,
rather than of the tribe.'"
This determination was relied upon by the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Weeks Construction, Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Housing
Authoriy,," in specifically holding the Oglala Sioux Housing
Authority to be an arm of the tribal government. The Eighth Cih
cuit stated that "a tribal housing authority possesses attributes
of tribal sovereignty, . . . and suits against an agency like the Hous-
ing Authority normally are barred absent a waiver of sovereign
immunity.""'
It is well settled that an IHA is not a "tribe" for purposes
of the federal jurisdictional statute that permits Indian tribes to
75, Ordinance %upra note 56. art. V. §§ 4 and 5
76. 565 F Supp 462 (D.S D 1983)
77 1i at 466
78 Id at 465-66.
79. 797 F 2d 668 (Nth Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 671. See also Wtldon v Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indian &
the Turtle Mountain Housing Auth.. 459 F. Supp, 366. 368-69 (D.N.D. 1978). where the
L'nited State, Ditrtct Court for the District of North Dakota found that both defendants
:ere uffictenl% linked uch that not only did tribal sovereign immunity pass to the Housing
,ulhorit, (TXIHA). but also that no %xai'er of that immunity was manifest. Thus the
lav..uit. filed b% a rurnke. Ill participant under the Indian Civil Rights Act against TXIHA
to enjoin an esction action filed by TMHA. 'as barred b, the tribe's sovereign immunity.
No. 21
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file suit in their own behalf." It also is clear that each Indian
tribe that utilizes the Model Tribal Ordinance in creating its IHA
not only will not be liable for the IHA's debts or obligations (unless
the tribe later agrees to do so)," but also that the tribe does not
agree to make the IHA a tribal "department" or "division" unless
the tribal ordinance specifically states this.'
The issue of whether an Indian housing authority is sufficiently
linked to HUD to be legally a "federal agency" was also addressed
by the United States Claims Court in Deroche v. United States.
4
H-.::re, a general contractor to an Indian housing project filed suit
against the United States in the Court of Claims, alleging that
the Blackfeet Indian Housing Authority allowed funds obligated
for certain housing construction contracts to be expended for other
purposes, with HUD's knowledge. In dismissing the claim, the
Court of Claims found that the IHA was not a federal agency
or auspice of the United States." The court relied on substantial
case law for the proposition that although it may be necessary
for the federal government to establish standards and requirements
for IHA housing projects, an IHA does not become an "agent"
of the federal government solely because of such control."
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of
Utah decided in Knowlton H. Brown Construction Co. v. Washoe
Housing Authority," that mere HUD approval of the IHA con-
struction contract with a general contractor does not give rise to
81 See Namekagon Dev. Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Auth.. 395 F. Supp.
23 (D Minn. 1974). affd. 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir. 1975); Hickey v. Crow Creek Housing
Auth. 379 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.D. 1974). 28 U S.C.A. § 1362 (1982) provides access to
federal district courts for recognized Indian tribes. It was intended to give tribes such
access. particularly when the United States declined to act for the tribes. See. e.g.. Moe
v Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes. 425 U.S. 463. 472-75 (1976); Gila River Indian
Community v. Henningson. Durham & Richardson. 626 F.2d 708. 710-15 (9th Cir 1980):
Navajo Tribal Util. Ass'n v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue. 608 F.2d 1228. 1231 (9th Cir.
1979) ("-Ae are convinced that section 1362 does not cover subordinate, semi-autonomous
tribal entities").
For a general discussion of federal court jurisdiction over actions brought by Indian
tribes under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (1982), see Annotation. United States District Court
Jurisdiction of A ction Brought by Indian Tribe Under 28 U.S.C.A.. § 1362. 65 A. L. R.
Fed 649 (1983).
82 See supra note 64.
83 See supra notes 56. 57. at n.2.
84 2 Ct. Cl 809 (1983).
85 Id at 811 n.1.
86 Id. at 812.
87 625 F. Supp. 595 (D. Utah 1985).
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an expressed or implied contractual relationship between HUD
and the general contractor. Said the court:
Although HUD, through its supervision of the use of federal
funds by the housing authority, approved the contract, its in-
volvement does not manifest an agreement between HUD and
the plaintiff. A representative of HUD signed the contract indi-
cating HUD's approval, but the contract named neither HUD
nor the United States as a party therein. The approval itself
did not create a contract, express or implied. [Citation omitted.]"
However, the Comptroller General of the United States has de-
termined that an IHA that receives funds from HUD to fund con-
struction of housing is tantamount to a "grantee" for purposes
of review by the General Accounting Office.' Therefore, each
IHA is bound by fundamental principles of federal procurement
inherent in the concept of competition.
Both tribally and state-created IHAs are "tribal organizations"
within the meaning of the federal statutes governing embezzlement
and misapplication of "tribal organization" funds." The Ninth
Circuit, in stating that "the [Hopi] tribe, through its Council, par-
ticipates in and exercises at least indirect control of the [Hopi
Tribal] Housing Authority and its activities," specifically recognized
the interdependence of the IHA with other "arms" of the tribal
government.'
Furthermore, the BIA has administratively determined that the
Salish and Kootenai Housing 'uthority of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai tribes of Montana qualifies as a "tribal organization"
under the Indian Self-Determination and Edpcation Assistance Act
of 197592 because the IHA's activities "include the maximum par-
88. Id at 602-03. See also Rosebud Housing Auth. v. LaCreek Electric Coop . Inc.
No. CIV-85-375. 13 Indian L. Rep, 6030 (Rbd Sx Tr. Ct. 1986) (HUD is not an in-
dispensable party in a tribal court action by an IHA against an electric cooperati.e doing
business on the reservation).
89. Comp. Gen. Op. No. B-215883 (Aug. 13. 1984).
90 United States '. Brame. 657 F,2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1981) and United States %. Eldred.
5W8 I- 2d 746 (9th Cir, 1978) (tribally created IHAs). United States '. Crossland. 642 F.2d
1113 (I0Mh Cir. 1981) (state-created IHA. See 18 U.S C. § 1163 (Supp. 1984)
,I Brame. 657 F.2d at 1092-93
92. 25 U.S.C § 450b(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The relevant statutory section reads
as, follovus:
"Tribal organization" means the recognized governing body of any Indian tribe. any
legall, established organization of Indians which is controlled, sanctioned, or chartered
b , such governing body or which is democratically elected by the adult members of
No. 2]
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ticipation of all [tribal] Indians."" As the Salish and Kootenai
Housing Authority may now apply in limited situations on behalf
of the tribes for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG)
funding pursuant to the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, as amended, 9 the question arises whether the IHA
itself may apply for CDBG funding in its own right pursuant to
the regulations.
Indian Housing Authorities Created
Pursuant to State Law
Regulations promulgated by HUD permit creation of an IHA
pursuant to state law where the state has authorized generally the
creation of public non-Indian housing authorities to carry out low-
income housing projects." A state-created IHA is established as
a corporate entity with enumerated powers similar (if not identical)
to those granted a city, county, or state public housing authority."
There are approximately forty state-created IHAs in the United
the Indian community to be served by such organization and which includes the max-
imum participation of Indians in all phases of its activities.
93 The BIA made this determination in a De,. 4. 1985. letter from Donovan Boldt,
Acting Area Superintendent. Flathead Agency. Pablo. Mont.. to John Dibella. Director.
Housing Development Division. HUD-Region VIII Office of Indian Programs, Denver, Colo.
94 42 U SC. §§ 5301-5320 (1982 & Supp Ill 1985) Pursuant to this statutory authori-
ty. HUD promulgated regulations to implement the Indian Community Development Block
Grant program. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 571.1- 704 (1986). Eligible applicants for Block Grant
funding include tribal organizations. wNhich are eligible under Title I of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act. when the Indian tribe, band, group, na-
tion, or Alaskan natie village creating the organization authorizes the organization to
apply for such funding through a concurring resolution. 24 C.F.R. § 571.5(b) (1986). Eligi-
ble tribal organizations pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination Act will be determined
b) the Bureau of Indian Affairs on a case-by-case basis. Id.
95. 24 C.F.R § 905.108(b) (1986).
96 A listing of the non-Indian state housing authority statutes is as follows: ALA.
CODE §§ 24-11 to -134 (Supp. 1985) (Alabama): ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.55.010-.290 (1985)
(Alaska; see infra notes 109-114): ARIZ. REV. STAT AN% §§ 36-1401 to -1425 (1974)
(Arizona); ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 19-3001 to -3080,24 (1980) (Arkansas); CAL. HEALTHI &
SAFETY CODE §§ 34200-34380 (Supp. 1986) (California): CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 29-4-101
to -732 (Supp. 1985) (Colorado); CONN. GEN. STAT. N§ 8-38 to -119aa (1985) (Connec-
ticut); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 31, §§ 4301-4322 (1975) (Delaware): D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-101
to -116 (1981) (providing for the National Capitol Housing Authorii) (District of Columbia):
FLA STAT. ANN. § 421 001-.55 (Supp. 1985) (Florida): GA. CODF ANN. §§ 8-3-1 to -208
(Supp 1985) (Georgia); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 356-1 to -41 (Supp 1984) (providing for
the I-awaii Housing Authority) (Hawaii); IDAHO CODE §§ 50-1901 to -1927 (1980) (Idaho).
ILL ANN. STAT. ch 67 1/2. §§ 1-27e (Smith-Hurd Supp 1985) (Illinois): IND. CODE ANN.
0 36-7-81-1 to -44 (Burns Supp. 1985) (Indiana): IowA CODE §§ 270,1-,60 (1985) (providing
for the Iowa Housing Finance Authority) (Iowa); KAN, STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2336 to -2365
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States that currently administer Indian housing programs. States
that have organized IHAs include Oklahoma (19), Alaska (12),
Maine (3), Texas (2), Connecticut (1), Nebraska (1), North Carolina
(1), and Utah (1).
HUD regulations governing the Indian housing programs apply
equally to both state-created and tribally created IHAs, with three
important exceptions. First, state-created IHAs are specifically ex-
empt from the requirement of enacting the HUD-prescribed Model
Tribal Ordinance.' Thus it is the state's prerogative as to how the
IHA will be organized, who shall be liable for its obligations, and
to what extent the IHA may waive sovereign immunity.
Second, state-created IHAs subject themselves to state civil and
criminal jurisdiction by their very creation. That an IHA is created
pursuant to state rather than federal law does not exempt it from
federal restrictions. In addition, any state statute that conflicts
(1981) (Kansas): Ki. REV STAT. §§ 80.010-.610 (Supp. 1984) (Kentucky): LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40:381-:581.41 (West Supp. 1985) (Louisiana); ME. REV. STAT. A.tN. tit. 30,
@ 4551-4788 (Supp. 1985) (Maine: see infra notes 115-120); MD. ANN. CODE art. 44A.
§§ 1-33 (Supp. 1985) (Maryiznd); MAss. GE,;. LAWS ANN. ch. 121B. §§ 1-59 (West Supp.
1985) (Masscchu.etts); Mtc ST. T A'-" §§ 16. I14(1)-.114(98)(f) (Callaghan 1982 & Supp.
1985) (Michigan); MINN. STAT. ANN. 3 462A.01- 24 (Wes, 1984) (Minnesota); Miss, CODE
AN. §§ 43-33-1 to -69 (Supp. 1985) (Mississippi); Mo. REv. S1AT. § 99.010-.230 (Supp.
1985) (Missouri); MONT. CODE A.iN §§ 7-15-2101 to -4532 (1985) (Montana); NEB. REv.
STA §§ 71-1518 to 1554 (1981) (Nebraska); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 315.140-.780 (Housing
Authority Law of 1947) and 315.960-.996 (State Rural Housing Authority Act) (1983)
(Nevada); N H. REV STAT. AN N. §§ 203:1-:27 (1977) (New Hampshire); N J. RE,-. STAT.
§§ 55: 14A-I to -58 (Supp. 1985) (New Jersey). N.M. STAT ANN,. §§ 3-45-1 to -25 (municipal
housing authorities). 1-3-1 to -6 (regional housing authorities), and 11.4-1 to -8 (New
Mexico State Housing Authority) (Supp. 1985) (New Mexico); N.Y. PuB. Hous. LAW
44A. §§ 30-57 (McKinney Supp. 1986) (New York): NC. GEN. STAT. §§ 157-1 to -70
(1982) (North Carolina). N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-11-01 to -36 (Supp. 1985) (North Dakota):
OtIto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3735.01 -.07 (Page Supp. 1984) (Ohio): 63 OK.A STAT. §§ 1051-99
(Supp. 1986) (Oklahoma; see mifra notes 102-108): OR. REV. STAT. §§ 456.055-.200 and
456.205..230 (1985) (Oregon); PA, STAT. ANN. tit 35, §§ 1541-68 (Purdon Supp. 1985)
(Pennsylvania); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 45-25-1 to 45-27-21 (1980) (Rhode Island). S C CODE
AN'; §§ 31-3-1 to -1360 (Law. Co-op 1976) (South Carolina): S.D. CODtrIED LAWS ANN.
4 13-7-1 to -109 (local housing and redevelopment) and 11-11-I to -185 (housing develop-
ment authority) (Supp. 1984) (South Dakota): TENN CoDE AN,,; §§ 13-20-101 to -614
(Supp. 1985) (Tennessee): TEX. REv. Civr STAT. ANN. art. 1269k (Vernon 1963) (Texas):
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-18-1 to -31 (1974) (Utah); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24. §§ 4003-4026
(Supp 1985) (Vermont); VA. CODE §§ 36-1 to -55.6 (1984) (Virginia): WASH. REv. CODE
ANs "§ 35-82-010 to -910 (1985) (Washington): W. VA. CODE §§ 16-15-1 to -25 (1985)
(West Virginia). WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.395- 404 (West Supp. 1985) (Wisconsin): Wyo.
STAT §§ 15-10-101 to -117 (1980) (,Vyoming). See generally Revised Model Business Cor-
poration Act Annotated. vol. 1-3 ,1984).
97. 24 CFR. § 905.109(a) (1986).
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with federal law must be subordinated to the federal law, following
a preemption analysis.
Third, it is not mandatory that an IHA organized pursuant to
state law be created by "exercise of a tribe's powers of self-
government"; thus, a tribal government is not a necessary prerequi-
site for its creation." At least two IHAs were created under state
law, although the respective tribes they were to service had been
terminated by an act of Congress."
Nine state housing authority statutes directly provide for the
creation of IHAs.' °° However, in at least three instances, an IHA
was organized under the state housing authority act that did not
specifically provide for the creation of IHAs.t '°
Three states have been particularly prominent, not only by the
number of IHAs created pursuant to state law but also by the pro-
fuse legal activity generated by these state-created IHAs. Oklahoma
enacted legislation permitting IHAs to be created pursuant to state
law,' ° ' and nineteen such IHAs presently administer Indian housing
prograims within state borders. Although these state-created IHAs
have been ruled to be arms of the state government, in legal con-
sequence they are a tribal entity." '
98, Id §§ 905.108(b). 905.109(a).
99. The Utah Paiute Tribal Housing Authority is the IHA for the Utah Paiute Tribe.
This IHA was created in 1974 despite the fact that its respective tribe, the Paiute Tribe
of Utah. was then currently terminated. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 741-760 (Vest Supp. 1983). The tribe
was not restored to federal status until 1980. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 761-768 (West Supp. 1983). The
Alabama-Coushatta Indian Housing Authority administers housing projects for a tribe
(the Alabama-Coushatta Tribe) that is currently terminated. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 721-728 (West
Supp. 1983)
100 These states are as follows: Alaska (A.ASKA STAT. §§ 18 55.995-.998 (1985)). Con-
necticut (CO ,. Grs STAT, § 47-66a (1985)). Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
40:581.1-41 (Supp. 1985), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 4731.4739 (1978)).
Maryland (MD ASN. CODE art. 44A, § 23A (1982)), Minnesota (MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§
462A.06) (See MINN, STAT. ANN. § 462A.07. subd. 14-15 (Supp. 1985)); St. Paul Intertribal
Hlousing Bd.. 564 F Supp. at 1408). North Carolina (N.C. G,4. STAT. §§ 157-66 to -70 (1982)).
Oklahoma (63 OK.A. STAT. § 1057 (Supp. 1984)). and Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-18-19
(1974)).
Additionally. North Dakota statutorly provides that any real property that is part
and parcel to an Indian housing project is exempt from levy and sale (N.D. CENT. CODE
& 23-11-28 (1978)). and that the property of an Indian housing project is exempt from
taxes and special assessments (N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-11-29 (1978)).
101 The Housing Authority of the Village of Winnebago, Nebraska (see NEB. REv.
STAT. §§ 71-1518 to .1554 (1981)). and the Alabama-Coushatta and the Tigua Indian Housing
Authorities of Texas (see TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269k (Vernon 1963)).
102. 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1057 (Supp. 1986)
103. Ahboah %. Housing Auth. of Kiowa Tribe. 660 P.2d 625. 632 (Okla. 1983). quoting
Ware %. Richardson. 347 F Supp 344. 347 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
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A dispute between members of the tribe and the IHA is an
intratribal matter over which federal courts cannot take jurisdic-
tion;' 0 4 however, a dispute between two groups of individuals each
claiming to be the same IHA of an Oklahoma tribe is a question
properly before the state courts.'"' The state also has no adjudica-
tory jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer by an IHA against
Indian lessees of trust allotments, as the land is properly Indian
country.' 6 An Oklahoma IHA's powt., of eminent domain, granted
by state statute,'"" has also been upheld as constitutional.' 0
Federal settlement legislation resulted in a state (Alaska) enacting
legislation specifically addressing and accepting control over
IHAs.' 9 In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act"' to address the aboriginal land claims of the
various Alaskan natives and tribes."' Twelve regional native cor-
porations were established," 2 with the individual Alaskan natives
acting as shareholders within the corporate structure. Twelve state
IHAs were established, patterned after the settlement legislation
enacted by Congress.' Alaskan IHAs may accept financial assist-
ance only from the federal government, and then only upon a
showing of an existing "acute shortage of housing. '
Maine has also been directly affected by federal settlement
legislation. The state enacted an IHA statute in 1965,1"1 pursuant
to which three IHAs were created to ensure that their respective
0'4 \are v. Richardson. 347 F Supp. 344 (W.D Okla 1972).
105 Housing Auth. of Choctaw Nation v Craytor. 600 P.2d 314 (Okla. 1979).
106- Ahboah v, Housing Auth. of Ktowa Tribe. 660 P.2d 625 (Okla. 1983).
107 63 OKLA. STAT § 1078 (Supp. 1986)1
108 Housing Auth. of Cherokee Nation . Langley. 555 P.2d 1025 (Okla. 1976)
109 ALASKA STAT §§ 18.55.995-.998 (1985) (the Alaska Indian Housing Authority
Act of 1971). See ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.55 010-.290 (1985) (the Alaska State Housing Author-
,% -i\ct of 1949).
110 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (Supp III 1985).
III. The settlement statutorily extinguished any and all land claims Alaskan Natives
ma) have had. or may become vested with in the future. against the United States 43
U S C T 1603 (Supp III 1985) For a general discussion of the unique legal status of
Alaskan Natives. See Alaska Chapter. Associated Gen7 Contrs.. 694 F.2d at 1168-69 n.10.
112 43 U.S.C. § 1606 (Supp. 11 1985) Provision was made for the creation of a
thirteenth regional corporation for Alaskan Native,. aged eighteen years or older, who
are not permanent residents of Alaska 13 U.S C. § 1606(c) (Supp. I11 1985).
113 ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.996(a) (1985)-
114 Id 18.55.110
115 ME. REv STAT AD.. tit 22. §- 1731-.1739 (1980) (the Maine Indian Housing
Authorit Law of 1965)
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state tribes could benefit from federal financial assistance. ' The
state also entered into cooperation agreements with the IHAs to
provide all of the customary municipal services to the reserva-
tions. However, subsequent federal litigation involving the Passa-
maquoddy, Penobscot, and Maliseet tribes" 7 led to the establish-
ment of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980 after
these tribes won the rights to almost two-thirds of the land in
the state.' 8 This federal legislation not only defined the terms
of the settlement agreement but spawned a second series of
legislative acts by the state.I" The Maine Supreme Court has recent-
ly determined that a specific provision of the federal settlement
agreement discharged the state's obligation to provide assistance
under those cooperation agreements.' 20
Ill. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Generally
It is well settled that the United States cannot be sued without
its consent.' 2' Similarly, a federal administrative agency may not
be sued unless Congress explicitly consented to such action.' 2
In order to assert a valid claim against the United States or one
of its agencies, the plaintiff must identify specific statutory authori-
zation for the type of suit before the court.
When Congress waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States or one of its agencies, such a waiver is to be narrowly con-
strued.' Moreover, Congress may circumscribe the waiver by re-
116 The Pasamaquoddy Reser,.ation Housing Authority, the Penobscot Reser,,ation
Tribal Housing Authoriis. and the Pleasant Point Passamaquoddy Reser.ation Housing
-%uthortt
117 Joint Tribal Council o1 Passamaquoddy Tribes v. Morton. 528 I- 2d 370 list
( 1975)
118 25 US.C A §§ 1721-1735 (West Supp. 1983)
119 Mf REv, SlM lit. 30. , 6201-6214 (Supp- 1985).
120 Indian T%%nshp Passamaquoddy Reservation Housing Auth. %. State. No. 3872.
12 Indian L Rep 5077 (Me 1985). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the .upertor
c'uri" ruling that section 12 of the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980 discharged
and released the %tate Irom certain obligations created by cooperation agreements for
muncipal services that it had entered into vsith the three state IHAs See rtupra note 74
121 Block . North Dakota ex ref Bd of Unts & School Lands. 46i 1;.S. 273 (1983):
I ehmin v Naksnan. 453 U i 156 (1981)
122 United State% v e'tan. 424 L S. 392 (1976). United State. % King. 395 U S
I (19691: Soriano % Untied States. 152 U+S. 270 (1957)
123 United State, % Mitchell. 445 U.S 535. 538 (1980): Minnesota '. United States.
305 C'S at 388 9
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quiring the would-be plaintiff to satisfy a number of preconditions
before bringing suit. '" Employees and officers of the United States
or its agencies are covered by sovereign immunity while acting
in their official and governmental capacity.''
The predominant method employed by Congress in specifically
waiving the immunity of an administrative agency is utilization
of a sue or be sued clause. For example, two congressional waivers
of sovereign immunity affect HUD. First, the HUD Secretary is
authorized "to sue or be sued in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion, State or Federal," while acting in his official capacity.,"
The Supreme Court, in discussing this HUD sue or be sued clause,
stated that in the absence of incontrovertible evidence supporting
implied restrictions within the clause, HUD "is not less amenable
to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances
would be.""'
This "sue or be sued" clause is not a general waiver for all
civil actions,"' nor is it an independent grant of jurisdiction.'"
Recovery is limited to funds in the possession and control of the
agency. '1
124. Deakyne . Department of Army Corps of Engrs.. 701 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1982).
cert denied, 464 U.S 818 (1983). United States v. 3.218.9 Acres of Land. 619 F.2d
288 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 449 U.S 872 (1980)
125. See 14 C WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER. FFDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3655 (1978).
126. 12 U.S C 1702 (1982). The pertinent section of this statute reads: "The Secretary
shall, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter and subchapters II. 111, V. VI.
VII. VIII. IX-A. IX-B and X of this chapter. be authorized, in his official capacity. to
sue and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction. State or Federal." No mention
is made in this section as to the jurisdiction of a tribal court. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals has held that this statutory waiver applies primarily to HUD's mortgage insurance
programs. United States % Adams. 634 F.2d 1261. 1265 (10th Cir. 1980).
127. Federal Housing Admin. Region IV v. Burr. 309 U.S. 2.12. 245 (1940). In Burr.
the Court held that section 1702 authorized a garnishment action against the Federal Housing
Administration for monies due an employee. However. execution of the judgment was
limited to "those funds w.hich have been paid over to the Federal Housing Administration
in accordance with § I and which are in its possession, severed from Treasury funds and
Treasury control - Id at 250.
128. Lomas & Nettleton Co v Pierce. 636 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981); Donohue v. United
States. 437 F. Supp 836 (D. Mich 1977); Aetna Cas & Surer) Co. %. United States.
655 F.2d 1047 (Ci. Cl 1981)
129 Industrial Indem.. Inc. %_ Landrieu. 615 F.2d 644. 646 (5th Cir. 1990); Marcus
Garsey Square %. Pierce. 595 F 2d 1126 (9th Cir, 1979)
130. Federal Housing Admin.. Region IV % Burr. 309 U.S- 242 (1940): Armor Eles.
Co -,. Phoenix Urban Corp . 493 F Supp 876 (D. Mass 1980); DeRoche %. United
States. 2 Ci Cl 809 (1983)
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In addition, HUD as a federal administrative agency may "sue
or be sued only with respect to its functions" performed pursuant
to the Housing Act.'3 ' Pursuant to this second immunity waiver,
HUD "shall continue to have the right to maintain an action or
proceeding to recover possession of any housing accommodations"
it or any other state or local housing authority administering or
operating a low-rent housing project under the Act.' 2
The majority of state statutes that organize and govern the activi-
ties of corporations simply direct that any business seeking to in-
corporate therein must include a provision in its bylaws that it
agrees to sue or be sued.' 3 The language is brief; yet this, in and
131. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1982)
132. It has been held that HUD's "functions" within meaning of section 1404a do
not include the payment of damages for the alleged contractual breaches arising from
a HUD-approved contract. See United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 1261 (loth Cir. 1980). The
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota also has held that this section
generally does not operate as a waiver in a civil rights action for damages brought by an
Indtan tribe against HUD arising from foreclosure on a housing project. See Little Earth
of United Tribes. Inc. v. HUD. 584 F Supp. 1292, 1299-1300 (D. Minn. 1983) In com-
paring section 1404a with section 1702. the court noted that the statutes had similar
application:
ISleveral courts have limited the waiver lunder § 1702) to suits seeking funds which
have already been allocated to a project, holding that suits for damages vere barred
because they would require diversion of funds already appropriated for another purpose
or appropriation of funds from the general treasury. See. e.g.. United States r. Adams.
0-4 F 2d 1261 (10th Citr 1980): Armor Elevator Company. Inc. v Phoenix Urban
Corp . 493 F. Supp. 876. 883 (D. Mas 1980).
The limited waiver contatned in § 1702 is similarly inapplicable here. Any monies
.iarded for claimed civil rights violations would either have to be diverted from funds
appropriate for another purpose or from the general treasury, not from a separate
fund within the control and possession of HUD.
581 F Supp at 1299. The court held that the waiver of section 1404a was inapplicable
hor the same reasons. 584 F. Supp at 129o-1300.
133 See Revised Model Business Corporation Act Annotated. § 3.02(l) (1984) The
sue or be sued clause contained within the Re%.ised Model Business Corporation Act states
a ftollo%&s
Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every corporation has perpetual
duration and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individual
to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs, including
-ithout limitation power:
(I) to stue or be sued. complain and defend in its corporate name
For a listing of all state business corporation acts. includtng their sue or be sued clauses.
%ee Re,.sed Model Business Corporation Act Annotated. vol. 1. at 194-96 (1984). The
A\mierican Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation.
Banking and Business Law. has included this clause in substantially the same form within
each model business corporation statute it has drafted Id. at 189.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
No. 2] HUD INDIAN HOUSING PROGRAMS
of itself, generally is sufficient to waive immunity concerning the
business activity of the corporation in any court, state or federal.
Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing the com-
mon law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign
powers.'" The Supreme Court, in interpreting the basis for this
immunity, has reasoned both that the immunity which was theirs
as sovereign nations "passed to the United States for their
benefit,"'' and that the tribes were once-independent nations with
"inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished."" ' This tribal immunity is extended to tribal officials
acting in their official and governmental capacity, but they are
not immune in their individual capacities for actions committed
outside the scope of their official capacities." '
An Indian tribe may waive its sovereign immunity in
several different ways. First of all, this immunity may be
waived by Congress, acting pursuant to its plenary power.'"
Second, a tribe may waive its immunity by consenting to
suit as a result of unilateral tribal action." 9 In his treat-
134. Puyallup Tribe. Inc. %. Washington Dep't of Game. 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977):
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 309 U.S. 506 (1940); Turner v United
States. 248 US 354 (1919) For a recent discussion by the Supreme Court reaffirming
this principle, see Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 55-56.
135 United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.. 309 U.S. at 512
136. Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 55.
137 Means v. Wilson. 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1975). cert. denied. 424 U,S. 958: Bruetie
Knope. 554 F. Supp. 301 (D. Wis 1983). Brunette ,,. Dann, 417 IF Supp. 1382 (D
Idaho 1976) See also Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at 59.
138. Santa Clara Pubelo. 436 U.S. at 58.
139 Jtzarilla Apache Tribe , Andrus. 687 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1982); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537. 540 (10th Cir. 1980). affd. 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (the Tenth
Circuit recognizes that the tribal council passed a fortnal resolution expressly waiving
sovereign immunity). In R.C Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Housing Auth. 521 F. Supp.
599 (D Mont. 1981). the Montana Federal District Court explained the legal background
for this proposition:
Justice Brandeis* language in Turner v. United States. 248 U.S. 354. 39 S Ct. 109.
63 L. Ed 2d 291 (1919). supports, at least by implication, the conclusion that specific
Congressional consent is not necessary for a tribe to waive its immumt. He writes
[wlithout authorization from Congress. the [Indian) Nation could not then have been
sued in any court, at least. [notl without its consent." Id. at 358. 39 S Ct at 110;
quoted in Namekagon. 5upra. at 28 [395 F. Supp 23. 28 (D. Minn 1974)] (emphasis
added) To the same effect is language from Puvallup Tribe v, Washington Game
Department. 433 U.S 165. 170-73. 97 S. Ci. 2616, 2619-22. 53 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1977).
%%here the Court's language implies that a tribe is free to waive its immunity. The
Courts in Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway. 520 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1975). cert. denied.
425 U S 903. 96 S C 1492. 47 L.Ed. 2d 752 (1976) and R.C. Ifedreen Company
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ise,'"I Felix Cohen states this to be a less-settled problem with no
clear judicial determination;'' however, federal case law supports
this proposition. In any event, a waiver cannot be implied but must
be unequivocally expressed and will be strictly construed;' 2 it is
also subject to the same limitations and restrictions applicable to
the United States and its administrative agencies. Any doubt as
to the waiver will be interpreted in favor of the Indian tribe.'43
Federal statute also prohibits Indian tribes from waiving immu-
nity by contract in matters affecting tribal trust property, without
consent of either the Secretary of the Interior or Congress.' 4
A second issue concerns the extent to which an Indian tribe
may transfer its sovereign immunity when it creates tribal corpora-
tions or entities to perform tribal business. The test generally utilized
by the federal courts to determine whether a semigovernmental Indian
enterprise is separate or coextensive with the tribal governmental
entity focuses not on the indices of control but on the legal issue
presented.'' The court measures the detrimental impact of asserting
jurisdiction against certain attributes of sovereignty belonging to
the tribal government.' 6 For example, section 16 of the IRA
authorizes any Indian tribe to adopt a constitution and bylaws
as a political governing body to exercise preexisting powers of
self-government.-' Section 17 of the IRA grants the Secretary of
the Interior the authority to issue charters of incorporation to such
tribes to conduct business with outside entities.' "" A section 17
corporation is more capable of obtaining credit and "otherwise
tBlacfeet rrihe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation and the Blackfeet Houj.ng
-Ithorit. CV-80-37-GF (Sept 30. 1980) at 3. have apparently taken the implication
irom the Supreme Court case to heart, concluding that the tribe involved in each case.
a dependent quasi-so.ereign nation .. enjoys suoereign immunity and cannot
be 'ued %tthout its consent or the consent of the Congress " (Citations omitted. em-
phasis added )
s2l F Supp- at 604 n 2
141 F Cotiti.. supra note 59
1-41 i a, 325 nn.358-362
142 Id at 124 nin 353.354
143 larvland Cas. Co. %Citens Nat'l Bank. 361 1 2d 517 (5th Cir. 1965). cert
rh'mted. 385 t '-, 918 (1966)
1--4 25 U 81 West 1983),
45 Naajo frbe % Bank of Ne., \exico. 70() I 2d 1285 (lOih Cir 1983)
146 Id. at 1287
147 25 U S C 476 (%\et 1983)1
14N /i 47'
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expediting the business of the tribe, while removing the possibility
of Federal liability for activities of that nature.... 9
The Department of the Interior recognizes that section 16 tribal
governr-rits and section 17 tribal corporations are legally different
entities."' Lawsuits against section 16 tribal governments and sec-
tion 17 Indian corporations inevitably involve the issue of tribal
sovereign immunity. If an Indian tribe organizes pursuant to section
16 of the IRA, its corporate charter does not waive the tribe's
sovereign immunity for governmental conduct. '
149. Southern Unique, Lid ", Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community. 674 P-2d
1376, 1383 (Ariz. App. 1983), quoting Memo. Sol. Op. No. M-36515. "Request For In-
terpretative Opinion On the Separability of Tribal Organizations Organized Under Sec-
tion 16 and 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act," 65 1. D. 483, 484 (1958).
150. Id.
151. MNaryland Cas. Co v. Citizens Nai'l Bank. 361 F.2d 517 (5th Cit. 1965). cert.
denied. 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Enterprise Elec. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe. 353 F_ Supp. 991
(D. Mont. 1973).
In Atkinson v. Haldane. 569 P.2d 151 (Alaska 1977), the Alaskan Supreme Court
was confronted with a wrongful death action arising from an automobile accident on
the reservation. The court determined that the sue or be sued clause in the tribal charter
had no effect in the tort action against the tribe itself. In discussing the fact that the
section 16 Indian community was equivalent to an Indian tribe for purposes of sovereign
immunity, the court quoted the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Maryland Cas. Co.. supra:
The fact that the Seminole Tribe was engaged in an enterprise private or commercial
mu character, rather than governmental. is not material. It is in such enterprises and
transactions that the Indian tribes and the Indians need protection. The history of
intercourse between the Indian tribes and Indians with whites demonstrates such
need. . - To construe the immunity to suit as not applying to suits on liabilities aris-
ing out of pri%ate tran'.actions would defeat the very purpose of Congress in not relax-
ing the immunity, namely, the protection of the interests and property of the tribes
and the individual Indians.
569 P.2d at 169-70. The court stated that "the essential diflerences between municipalities
and tribes have led the courts not to recognize the proprietary act/governmental funition
lest for application of sosereign immunity." Id.
The court continued in a footnote:
Implicit in these conclusions is our determination that the cases. Martinez [Miartmez
% Southern Ute Tribe. 374 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962)]. Maryland Casualty [Maryland
Cas. Co. %,. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied. 385 U.S.
'918 (1966)1. and Fontenelle [Fontenelle %.. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143 (8th Cir 1970)]
-ire either not persuasive or are distinguishable from the case at bar We do not find
lartinez persuasive, primarily because the Colorado Supreme Court does not address
the difficult issues inherent in a case of that kind. However. Martmnez is also readily
distinguishable; it involved suit against a tribe which had mixed the governmental and
corporate entities in the corporate charter and thus. at least arguably, had vkaived in-
mumi') for all purposes In the case a. bar, the clause, by its terms, applies onl, to
the [section 171 corporation. Maryland Casualty involved actions that %%ere clearl. of
a corporate nature; thu,. even Linder the distinction articulated here, the tribe would
be subject to suit. (ontenelle is more difficult to distinguish because it involved rights
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Section 5(i) of the typical section 17 corporate charter states
that corporations shall retain the power
to sue and be sued in courts of competent jurisdiction within
the United States; but the grant or exercise of such power to
sue or be sued shall not be deemed a consent by the said Commu-
nity [section 17 tribal corporation] or by the United States to
the levy of any judgment, lien, or attachments upon the prop-
erty of the Community other than income or chattels especially
pledged or assigned.'
2
The language of the clause moots the issue of whether state
or federal courts will be precluded from hearing the matter because
the clause stated above contains the phrase "in courts of competent
jurisdiction within the United States." This would imply tl-e inclu-
sion of tribal courts as well as state and federal courts (cimpare,
supra); 12 U.S.C. § 1702 contains the language "in any court
of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal"; 42 U.S.C. § 1404a
does not specify in which courts HUD may be sued. The model
language of this clause also expressly bars "levy of any judg-
ment, lien or attachment of the tribe," except when pertaining
to "income or chattels especially pledged or assigned." Cohen
states that "some courts have held this language to be a waiver
of the immunity of the tribal corporation. . . . But this waiver
is limited to actions involving the business activities of the section
17 corporation.""'
It is also clear that the waiver of sovereign immunity by the
section 17 corporation does not waive immunity of the section 16
tribal government. ' Cohen identified the import of this issue:
to land which may have been the property of either aspect of the tribe. However.
%ince the issue was not discussed in Fonrenelle. we do not consider it appropriate prece-
dent for resolution of the issue in the case at bar.
569 P.2d at 175 n.83. Cohen lists many of the cases explained in this article, but noted
that the holdings in Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F 2d 143 (8th Cir, 1970). Brunette
%. Dann. 417 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Idaho 1976). and Martinez %. Southern Ute Tribe. 374
P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962). were arguably incorrect decisions. F. CoHEN, supra note 59. at 326
152 See Southern Unique, Ltd., 674 P.2d at 1380. Ramey Constr. Co. '6. Apache
Tribe. 673 F.2d 315. 319-20 (10th Cir. 1982). The issue often is complicated by the fact
that a tribal government, and the business corporation it creates, have the same name.
153 F. CotEns, supra note 59. at 326.
l,4 Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe. 673 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1982). In Ra.ne;i.
a general contractor sought to recover contract retainage withheld by a tribe, as well as
damages for breach of contract. After noting that a waiver of sovereign immunity is to
be strictly construed, the Court stated:
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Complications in determining the waiver can arise from the fact
that many tribes have not clearly separated the activities of their
section 16 tribal governments from the section 17 business corpor-
ations. This should not broaden the consent provision, because
congressional authority for the consent to suit is clearly
predicated on the existence of two different organizations and
is limited to business transactions. Any action against the tribe
acting in a government capacity is beyond the scope of the waiver
and should be barred.'" -
Indian Housing Authorities Created by Tribal Action
Article V, section 2 of the Model Tribal Ordinance also includes
a sue or be sued provision, which states as follows, with emphasis
added:
The [Tribal] Council hereby gives its irrevocable consent to
allowing the [Housing] Authority to sue and be sued in its corpor-
ate name, upon any contract, claim or obligation arising out
of its activities under this ordinance and hereby authorizes the
Finally. the presence of a -sue or be sued" clause in the triba; corporate charter cannot
ere as a waiver of sovereign immunit, in this case. The trial judge found that Ramey
contracted and dealt only with the Mescalero Apache Tribe as a constitut;onal entity.
and not with the Mescalero Apache Tribe. Inc.. the tribal corporate entity. ... Section
476 of the Indian Reorganization Act. 25 U.S.C. § 476. authorizes Indian Tribes to
organize a constitutional entity, and § 477 authorizes organization of a corporate entity.
Mlost courts that have considered the issue have recognized the distinctness of these
two entities . Therefore. the consent to suit clause in the corporate charter of the
Me.scalero Apache Tribe. Inc.. in no way affects the sovereign immunity of the tribe
as a constitutional entity.
Id at 320
Concerning torts allegedly committed by a section 17 corporation, the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska held in Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian
Community. 451 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Alaska 1978). that if an airport and an aviation
,ompanrv were owned and operated by the same section 16 tribal governmental entity.
the action would be precluded by soereign immuni., On cross-motions fot summary
judgment. the court found that there %as sufficient e,,idence that the proper dtfendani
%as the section 17 corporate entity, and held further that the corporation's immunity
had been waived by a sue or be sued clause in the tribal corporate charter, The court
noted that the issue had been presented in a similar fashion. with the same conclusion.
in Namekagon Dev. Co -. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Auth.. 395 F. Supp. 23 (D.
Ilinn 1I74). aff'd. 517 F.2( 508 (8th Cir. 1975) (inolving a tribally created IHA). and
thai the i%,ue was not raised on appeal See 451 F Supp, at 1137 n.21
155 F COI.-N. supra not. 59. at 326,
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Authority to agree by contract to waive any immunity from
suit which it might otherwise have; but the Tribe shall not be
liable for the debts or obligations of the Authority.
Two distinguishing factors are noted about this particular sue
or be sued clause. First, the clause fails to state in which courts
the IHA may be sued. The sole jurisdictional limitation in the
ordinance mandates that the tribal courts "shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine an action for eviction of a tenant or home-
buyer.""' Second, the clause contains an express condition regard-
ing waiver; the tribal council authorizes the IHA to waive sovereign
immunity in any situation involving a contract, claim, or obligation
that arises as a result of the IHA's business activities, but ap-
parently allows the IHA to do so only by contract.
HUD had the opportunity to simply model the IHA's sue or
be sued clause after its own statutory waiver, that of section 16
and section 17 corporations, other businesses created pursuant to
state law or other state and local governments; however, HUD
did not draft the Model Tribal Ordinance in this manner.
In the seminal case of Namekagon Development Co. v. Bois
Forte Reservation Housing Authority," ' the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota seized the opportunity to set
precedent in discussing the sovereign immunity issue where a con-
struction contract was involved. The court specifically analyzed
the decision of Hickey v. Crow Creek Housing Authority,'"
rendered earlier that year (1974). Although the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of South Dakota had dismissed the
Hickey case on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the issue
of whether the IHA defendant had waived immunity, the Hickey
court also explained that any waiver -f sovereign immunity would
limit jurisdiction of the Crow Creek Tribal Court.'' 9 The
Namekagon court directly attacked this reasoning:
This Court cannot agree [with the Hickey court's analysis], for
there is little logic to that proposition [of limiting waiver to
tribal court) and there is no language in the [Model Tribal] Ordi-
nace limiting the consent to suits in tribal court. It is important to
the development of the Indian tribes that they be given a greater
156. Ordinance, supra note 56. art. VIII. § I(f).
157 395 F. Supp. 23 (D. Minn. 1974). affid. 517 F.2d 508 (8th Cir 1975)
158 379 F Supp, 1002 (DS.D. 1974).
159. Id. at 1003.
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control over their own destinies. If they are to be permitted to
form corporations to conduct semi-governmental activities, they
must of necessity be permitted to waive immunity from suit with
respect to those activities. If a tribe can unilaterally consent
to suit ;n a tribal court, there is no reason why it should be
incapable of consent to suit in a Federal court.' 0
In protecting the interests of the off-reservation contractor doing
business with the IHA, Judge Heaney additionally noted:
To dismiss this suit against the local Housing Authority on
grounds of sovereign immunity would be grossly unfair. The
Reservation Business Community purported to create an indepen-
dent corporation which would be legally responsible for its pro-
mises. It invited outsiders to do business with it on a contractual
basis, and the corporation promised the plaintiff over one million
dollars in compensation.' +'
The federal district court in Namekagon did not address the
jurisdictional issue, as it assumed that if the IHA had waived im-
munity the court could proceed to the merits. However, on ap-
peal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court held that
although the I HA could and did refuse to relinquish its general
immunity from levy and execution, it did relinquish that immunity
as to all funds it received from HUD for payment of its contractual
obligations.' 2 Since the contract between the IHA and the devel-
oper expressly provided that all HUD funds were available to effect
payment and performance under the contract, the issuance of the
injunction was affirmed.
The "grossly unfair" test of Namekagon originally became the
basis for a federal .,ourt finding that an IHA, as a party to the
construction contract, has waived immunity in those settings. At
least two other federal district courts have specifically relied upon
the "grossly unfair" test in finding that the IHA defendant had
waived its sovereign immunity in executing a construction contract
with the plaintiff contractor.' 6
The Ninth Circuit adopted a more direct approach to this issue
160. 395 F Supp at 28-29.
161. Id, at 29 temphasts added)
162. 517 F,2d at 509-10
163 R C. -ledreen Co.. 521 F. Supp. at 603-07; Murray Insulation & Drywall. Inc.
Srhtinderbolh Fnierp . Inc. & Rosebud Housing Auth .No. 79-46-W. 7 Indian L. Rep.
1175 (S.D- Iowa 1980)
No. 2)
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in R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority.'" Here
the court was confronted with the legality of a tribal court's writ
of attachment against the plaintiff contractor's construction equip-
ment rather than the underlying construction contract. The court
determined in a footnote that any sovereign immunity of the Fort
Belknap IHA had been waived through a combination of the Fort
Belknap Tribe's enactment of the tribal ordinance creating the
IHA and the IHA's entering into a construction contract with
the plaintiff general contractor. ' The sue or be sued clause in
the ordinance creating the Fort Belknap Housing Authority also
is identical to article V, section 2 of the Model Tribal Ordinance."6,
Similarly, in Ledford v. Housing Authority of the Sac & Fox
Tribe,'6 the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
determined that the defendant IHA waived its sovereign immunity
under the tribal ordinance and also by entering into a construction
contract with the plaintiff.'' However, the district court noted
that any waiver was limited under the ordinance and the contract
to mechanics' liens available under Kansas law.' 69
164. 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983). cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985),
165. 719 F.2d at 982 n.2. The Court explained as follows:
The tssue of citizenship for this [diversityl purpose is often entangled with the issue
of sovereign immunity Any sovereign immunity the Housing Authority had. however.
was waived through operation of Fort Belknap Ord. No. 2-77, art. V. § 2 (1977).
a "sue or be sued" clause in the ordinance establishing the Housing Authority. See
also 24 C.F.R. § 805.108-.109 & app. I. art. V. § 2.
166. 719 F.2d at 982 n.2.
167. 609 F. Supp. 211 (D. Kan. 1985).
168. The court noted:
The relevant provisions of this tribal ordinance are the same as the relevant provisions
of the tribal ordinance involved in Namehagon Development Company v. Bois Forte
Reservation Housing Authority, 517 F 2d 508 (8th Cir. 1975). There, the coart noted
that since an Indian tribe is immune from unconsented suit. the court must construe
any consent to suit strictly and enforce any conditional limitations imposed on that
consent. The court held that under what is Article VII.7 above restrictions were placed
on the waiver so that the net iesult of the ordinance was a waiver only of the right
to be free from suit and not of the right to be free from judicial execution upon any
judgment arising from such suit. Id. at 509. However, the court noted that the very
terms of the ordinance (Article V.2 of the instant contract) authorized the Authority
to "agree by contract to waive any immunity from suit which it might otherwise have."
Thus. it is necessary in the instant case, to consider the terms of the contract between
plaintiff and defendant. Here, at Section 2.26 of the contract between plaintiff and
defendant, the parties clearly contemplated mechanics liens and this contractual provi-
sion must be read as a waiver by the defendant of its sovereign immunity as to mechanics
liens.
Id at 213.
169. Id. See infa note 281. The court also labeled the IHA as a "Kansas corpora-
lion " d. at 212. which may be misleading.
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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals took this reasoning one
step further in Weeks Construction, Inc.'7 0 The court found that
the Oglala Sioux Tribe's mere enactment of the Model Tribal Ordi-
nance constituted an express waiver of sovereign immunity by the
Oglala Sioux Housing Authority in a construction contract setting."'
In Dubrav v. Rosebud Housing Authority,' 2 the plaintiffs in
the federal court action filed an identical action in the Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Court." ' The cause of action centered around a dis-
pute for wrongful termination of employment by the Rosebud
Housing Authority. The tribal court, in finding that the IHA had
not waived its sovereign immunity, distinguished Namekagon
Development Co. on the basis that no written contract existed
between the parties." 4
Two observations are noted at this juncture. First, many federal
courts have considered the tribe's mere enactment of the sue or
be sued clause itself to be the waiver of sovereign immunity. How-
ever, a few courts have looked deeper to the specific factual situa-
tion before it, not unlike the test utilized in situations involving
section 17 corporations. Applying this analysis, the situation must
involve a "contract, claim or obligation" before waiver may be
asserted. The issue appears to be whether the tribally created IHA,
vested with limited sovereign immunity through enactment of the
Model Tribal Ordinance, has waived that immunity by entering into
a contract.
Second, it is conceivable that an IHA will be deemed to have
waived its immunity in situations involving not only a contract
but any other "claim" or "obligation" it may be bound by. The
courts will address this issue on a case-by-case basis; it may be
assumed, however, that the inclusion of these terms within the
ordinance potentially broadens the scope of the waiver provision.
Thus the IHA may not be able to use the sue or be sued clause
170- 797 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1986)
171 Id at 670.71.
172 No CIV-83-01. 12 Indian L Rep. 6015 (Rbd. Sx Tr. Ct. 1985)
173 See supra text accompanying note 76.
174 12 Indian [ Rep at 6015 Said the court:
This case is easily distinguishable from Namekagon. The plaintiffs in this case cannot
show any express contractual waiver of sovereign immunity As the court of appeals
stated in 'dmekagon. supra. a housing authority can refuse to relinquish its general
immunt from suit. and that is exactly what the Rosebud Housing Authority has done
a,, a matter of practice except for certain construction contracts. Since no particular
expres contractual immunity waiver exists as to the plaintiffs' employment, the housing
authority cannot be said to have waived the general immunity to which it was otherwise
entitled
No. 21
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as a shield where it enters into a loan agreement or a promissory
note, or executes a mortgage upon IHA property.'" The IHA
also may not be able to assert immunity from an action arising
out of other contracts it has entered into, including the ACCs
executed with HUD or the individual agreements entered into with
the IHA's rental tenants or Mutal Help participants.
Indian Housing Authorities Created Pursuant to State Law
State-created IHAs, as mentioned above, are subject to the state
laws and regulations under which they were created. The majority
of the fifty states have inserted sue or be sued clauses in the
statutory provisions that become the articles of incorporation of
the IHA.' ' These sue or be sued clauses simply state that the
IHA may sue or be sued in its corporate capacity.
175. See Ordinance, supra note 56, art. V, § 3() ("To borrow or lend money, to
issue temporary or long term evidence of indebtedness, and to repay the same. Obligations
shall be issued and repaid in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of this ordi-
nance") and § 3(g) ("To pledge the assets and receipts of the Authority as security for
debts; and to acquire, sell, lease, exchange, transfer or assign personal property or interests
therein.")
176. A listing of the applicable non-Indian state housing authority sue or be sued clauses
are as follows: A.A. CODE §§ 24-1-27(22) (municipal housing authorities), 24-1-66 (county
housing authorities) and 24-1-109 (regional and consolidated housing authorities) (1986)
(Alabama); AL&s.A STAT. § 18.55.100(a)(1) (1986) (Alaska): Arizona does not have a specific
sue or be sued clause (but see ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1424 (1986), municipal housing
authority powers are supplemental to other powers conferred upon municipalities, §§ 9-101
to -1281 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 19-3011(a) (1980) (Arkansas); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 34311(a) (West 1979) (California); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4-209(q) (1977) (municipal
housing authorities) and 294-505(a) (1986) (county housing authorities) (Colorado); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 8-44 (Supp. 1987) (Connecticut), DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 31, § 4308(a)(5) (1975)
(Delaware); District of Columbia's statute does not specifically provide for a "sue or be
sued" clause (but see D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-102 (1981). the powers of the National Capitol
Housing Authority president are vested in the mayor. §§ 1-301 to -366 (1981)); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 421 08(I) (1986) (Florida); GA. CODE ANN. § 8-3-30(a)(I) (1982) (Georgia); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 356-10(a) (1985) (Hawaii)* IDAHO CODE § 50-1904(a) (1980) (Idaho); ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 671/, § 8.5 (Smith-Hurd 1959) (Illinois); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-18-15(0)
(Burns 1981) (Indiana): IowA CODE § 220.5(2) (1985) (Iowa); K^A,." STAT. ANN. § 17-2340
(1981) (in any suit involving state-created housing authorities, a statutory conclusive presump-
tion exists that the municipality created and authorized its housing authority to transact
business) (Kansas); Ky. REV. STAT. § 80.050 (municipal housing authorities) (1986). §§
80.262 (county housing authorities) and 80.500(l) (regional housing authorities) (1986).
both refer to § 80.050 (Kentucky): LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:474(l) (1977) (Louisiana);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 4651(l) (1978 & Supp. 1986) (Maine); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 44A, § 8(a) (1986) (Maryland): MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 121B, §§ II(a) and 26
(1981 & Supp. 1987) (Massachusetts); MICH. STAT. AN N, § 16.114(22)(a) (Supp. 1985)
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IV. Jurisdiction Over Tribally Created
Indian Housing Authority Matters
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. For a plaintiff
to gain the opportunity to argue the merits of his claim in federal
district court, the complaint must allege an independent statutory
ground for jurisdiction.." Parties suing a tribally created IHA
have attempted to utilize many statutory bases as a means of ob-
taining federal jurisdiction over the matter with varying degrees
of success.
The following discussion focuses on litigation involving tribally
created IHAs. However, IHAs organized under state statute are
(Michigan); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 462A.06 (Supp. 1987) (Minnesota); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 43-33-11(a) (1981) (Mississippi); Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.080(1)(I) (1971 & Supp. 1987)
(Missouri); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-15-4451(2)(a) (1985) (Montana); NEn. REV. STAT. §
71-1528(l) (1986) (Nebraska); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 315.430(1) (Housing Authority Law
of 1947) and 315.983(2)(a) (State Rural Housing Authority Act) (1985) (Nevada); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 203.8(1) (1977) (New Hampshire); N.J. REV. STAT. § 55:14A-7(a) (Supp.
1987) (New Jersey); New Mexico's applicable statute does not mention a sue or be sued
clause (but see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-3-6(a) (1978)) (New Mexico); N.Y. PuB. Hous.
LAW 44A. § 37(1)(s) (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1987) (New York); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
157.9 (1982) (North Carolina); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-11-11(2) (1978) (North Dakota):
Onto REV. CODE AN. § 3735.31(a) (1980 & Page Supp. 1986) (Ohio); 63 OKLA. STAT.
§ 1061(a) (Supp. 1986) (Oklahoma): OR. REV. STAT. § 456.120(1) (1985) (Oregon); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 35. § 1550(t) (1977) (Purdon 1977) (Pennslyvania); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
45-25-15 (1980) (Rhode Island): South Carolina's "sue or be sued" clauses are contained
within each of six separate statutory sections (see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-3-10 to -1360
(Law Co-op 1976); S.D CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 11-7-18 (local housing and redevelop-
ment) and I I-I 1.27(l) (housing development authority) (1982) (South Dakota); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 13-20-104(25) (1987) (Tennessee): TEX. REV. CIV, SAT. A,;%-. art. 1269k (Vernon
1963) (Texas); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-18-9(1) (1986) (Utah); V1. STAT. ANN. tit. 24. §
4008(1) (1975) (Vermont). VA. CODE § 36-19(a) (1984) (Virginia); WASH. REV. CODE ANN
§ 35-82-070(I) (1965 & Supp, 1987) (Washington); W. VA. CODE § 16-15-7 (1985) (West
Virginia); Wts. STAT, ANN. § 66.40(9)(n) (1965) (Wisconsin); and Wyoming. whose housing
authority statute does not contain a specific sue or be sued clause (but see the general powers
of local governing bodies. § 15-1-103f-iXi) (1980)). See Revised Model Business Corporation
Act Annotated. -,ol. 1. at 184-8f (1984).
The state sue or be sued clau'cs applicable to IHAs created by the state statutes men-
tioned above include the following; ALASKA STAT. § 18.55.100(a)(1) (1986) (Alaska); CoNN
GE%. STAT. § 8-44(a) (Supp. 1987) (Connecticut); LA. REV. STAT A.%.%. § 40:581.23(A)(1)
(Supp. 1985) (Louisiana); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 30. § 4651(1) and tit. 22. § 4733
(1978 & Supp. 1986) (,latne); ID. A',.. CODE art. 44A. § 8(A) (1986) (Maryland); MINN,
STAT § 462A.06 subd. 2 (Supp. 1987) (Minnesota); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 157-9 (1982) (North
Carolina); 63 OKLA. STAT. § 1061(a) (Supp. 1986) (Oklahoma). UTAH CODE ANN. §
55-18.9(1) (1986) (Utah) See supra note 100.
177. Electric Enrerp. Co. 353 F. Supp. at 992; Schubert Constr. Co. v. Seminole
Tribal Housing Auth . 490 F. Supp. 1008. 1009 (S.D Fla. 1980)
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subject to the same state civil and criminal jurisdiction as any
other state, county, or municipal public housing authority. That
the IHA has consented to such jurisdiction strongly rebuts the
argument that assumption of state jurisdiction does not impinge
upon the tribe's right to self-government. State court jurisdiction
is more likely where a state-created IHA is concerned because the
applicable state public housing authority act vests jurisdiction over
the state IHA with the court. Federal preemption will not apply
unless the housing act or federal regulations squarely conflict
with state law.
Federal Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Federal Question Jurisdiction
Section 1331 of title 28 of the United States Code provides that
a federal district court "shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States." The asserted right must depend upon the operative effect
of federal law or statute, i.e., the result of the suit must depend
upon the construction and effect of such law.''
It is well settled that this statutory grant of jurisdiction will
support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those
of a statutory origin.' 9 Thus, in order to invoke a federal district
court's federal question jurisdiction, it is not essential that a claim
be based upon a specific federal statute, treaty, or provision of
the Constitution; however, it is necessary that the claim sufficiently
"arise under" federal common law. A case does not arise under
federal law if the complaint merely anticipates or replies to a prob-
able defense that would be based on federal law.' 0
The district court may take jurisdiction if it must make deter-
minations of law in order to ascertain the existence of a federal
claim."' Thus federal question jurisdiction is not defeated by the
possibility that the averments of the complaint might fail to state
a cause of action upon which the plaintiff may recover, for the
178 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank. 299 U.S. 109. 112 (1936).
179 Illinois % City of Milwaukee. 406 U.S 91. 100 (1972).
180 National Farmers' Union Ins. Co. v Crow Tribe. 471 U.S. 845 (1985). See Phillips
Pei Co 6 Texaco. Inc.. 415 U.S. 125 (1974): American Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co.. 241 U.S 257. 260 (1916).
i8l R J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth.. 719 F.2d 979. 981 (9th Cir.
1983). cert denied. 472 U S I16 (1985). See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S 678 (1946).
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failure to state such a cause of action calls for judgment on the
merits, not for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction." 2
Where Indians are involved, the federal district courts generally
decline to accept jurisdiction over matters concerning purely internal
affairs of the tribe and involving exclusively Indians as parties.
The mere fact that an Indian is a party to a lawsuit, or that the
subject matter involves Indian property or contracts, does not in
and of itself grant a federal district court jurisdiction to hear the
case." The courts will scrutinize not only the factual situation
but the applicable tribal code to determine if the issue is specifically
addressed by tribal legislation; if so, the issue generally must be
addressed in the first instance by the tribal court. The absence of a
state and tribal forum alone will not compel the federal court, as a
court of limited jurisdiction, to hear a case if the matter is not
properly before it." '
In 1985 the Supreme Court established a benchmark as to when
an Indian tribal matter sufficiently arises under federal law to sup-
port federal question jurisdiction. In National Farmers' Union
Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe,'" an Indian brought suit in
182. Bell. 327 U.S. at 682.
183. Martinez v, Southern Uie Tribe. 249 F.2d 915. 917 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied.
363 U.S, 678 (1958).
184. Schantz v. White Lightning. 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974). Thus federal courts
have accepted federal question juri diction in an action brought by a non-lndian private
landowner on an Indian reservation to prevent imposition of the tribe's health regulations
against him (Cardin v. De La Cruz. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1981). cert. denied. 459 U.S.
967 (1982)); a non-Indian used car salesman's attempt to repossess a car sold to a reservation
India,, (Babbitt Ford. Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe. 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1983). cert.
denied. 466 U.S. 926 (1984)); a tribe's attempt to prevent a nonreservation bank from
wrongful set-off of a tribal housing and development enterprise debt against tribal funds
(Navajo Tribe v. Bank of Ne%s Mexico, 700 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1983)); an oil company's
challenge to a tribe's attempt to cancel a lease of trust land (Tenneco Oil Co. v. Sac
& Fox Tribe. 725 F.2d 572 10th Cir. 1984)); and a tribal challenge to the BIA's attempted
refusal to recognize a tribal election (Goodface v. Grassrope. 708 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1983)).
Similarly, however. U.S. disinct courts have refused to entertain federal question jurisdic-
tion in a number of situations involving Indians. These include actions involving exclusively
internal tribal elections (Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council v. Minnesota Chippewa
Tribe. 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir 1967)); an action brought by non-Indians arising out of
an automobile acctdent occurring on a reservation (Schantz v. White Lightning. 502 F.2d
67 (8th Cir 1974)); an action involvtng a mortgage of allotted land on a reservation to
provide security for a Mutual Help home (Northwest S.D. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Smith.
No 84-2460, 13 Indian L. Rep. 2069 (8th Cir. 1986)); and an action brought by a nonreserva-
tton electric contractor for %vork performed on a tribal center complex (Enterprise Elec. Co.
Blackfeet Tribe. 353 F Supp. 991 (D. Mont. 1973)).
185 471 US 845 (1985)
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the Crow Tribal Court against the Lodge Grass school Dis-
trict, a political subdivision of the state of Montana possessing
land within the exterior boundary of the Crow Reservation, upon
which state land the Indian was injured. Before the tribal court
considered the issue on its merits, the school district and its in-
suring agent brought a separate action in the United States District
Court for the District of Montana, alleging federal question
jurisdiction.
A unanimous Supreme Court, reversing the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, decided that the federal district court would have juri-
diction to review the tribal court's assertion of jurisdiction;
however, the plaintiff had to first exhaust all his tribal court
remedies.'" The Court found that the question of federal court
jurisdiction "will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
the extent to which sovereignty has been altered, divested or
diminished, as well as a detailed study of the relevant statutes,
Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere,
and administrative or judicial decisions.""' Thus the issue of
whether federal action should have been dismissed by the district
court or merely held in abeyance pending a ruling on the merits
by the tribal court was left to the district court."' However, the
issue of whether plaintiffs were required to exhaust all their tribal
remedies was relegated to the tribal court.
The Court in effect established a two-pronged test, binding upon
the federal district courts, that must be satisfied before federal
question jurisdiction exists. First, the issue must arise under federal
law in the context of the federal question statute. Second, the
plaintiff must exhaust all available tribal court remedies.' 89
The companion case to National Farmer's Union, R. J. Williams
Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, involved an action by
a prime contractor seeking return of certain construction equipment
and materials held by the Fort Belknap Tribal Court as satisfaction
186 Id at 853.57
187. Id at 855-56- See also New Mexico ,. Mescalero Apache Tribe. 462 U.S 324.
131-32 (1983). merrnon. 455 U.S. at 137; Colville Reservation. 447 U.S. at 152.
188, 471 U S. at 857.
189 In a footnote, the Court outlined a narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement:
We do not suggest that exhaustion wsould be required where an assertion of tribal
jurisdiction "is motivated by a desire to harass or i. conducted in bad faith," ...
or w here the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions, or where
exhaustion would be utile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge
the court", jlrisdtction-**
471 U S at 856 n.2! See A & A Concrete. Inc.. 781 F.2d at 1416.
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for an outstanding debt to the Fort Belknap Housing Authority
pursuant to a writ of attachment.' 0 The Ninth Circuit found that
the issue of whether the tribal court had overstepped its jurisdictional
boundaries in issuing the writ of attachment properly defined a
federal question, and declared that federal question jurisdiction
could be asserted by the lower court. However, the Court reversed
the lower court's award of damages to the contractor on the basis
that it did not state a federal claim upon which relief could be
granted.' 9 ' In doing so, it rejected four specific arguments by the
plaintiff contractor as unmeritorious.' 2 The Supreme Court, at
the same time it rendered the National Farmers' Union decision,
denied certiorari to hear R. J. Williams.
Two recent cases presented to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals have further defined what constitutes a federal question in
lawsuits against tribally created IHAs. In Weeks Construction Co.,
the Eighth Circuit was confronted with a common breach of con-
tract action, filed by a general contractor against a tribally created
IHA. The Court held that no federal question jurisdiction existed
in the matter, expressly stating that interpretation of the construc-
tion contract entered into between the parties was governed by
local rather than federal law."'
In Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Association v.
Smith,'" the plaintiff sued two lhdian individuals to foreclose on
a mortgage of allotted land upon which a Mutual Help home was
attached. The Cheyenne River Housing Authority was named as
a defendant because of its potential interest in the subject land
and home. The Court, after determining that federal question jur-
isdiction existed in the context of section 483 of title 25 of the
United States Code, dismissed the matter for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.' 9 '
1(1 719 1- 2d 979 (9th Ctr 19831. cert dented. 472 U.S. 1016 (1985).
191 719 1--2d at 981
192 Id at 981-82 rhe plainliff contractor attcmpled it) %how ihai 1w. right, Lildur
tili I' S Contilulton. dhc Indian Civil Rights. Act. 25 U S.(. § 1301-1341 (1982). and
lh ( %,l Right% At of 1866, 42 t1 S.( § 1981 (1982). were imperinwlobl% violiled 1lhC
( outI rejected thcse argurnrcn s, along wit the argurne l ilhal Ith I ibal couirt "  ldorllon
i ,ol Int a ai l , a% a guideline wa , a rchlrquitlliieni of overeigilly
l')1 1 feeAs ('onvtr Co . 797 I-+2d at 672 See Bicgas %. Kerr-M(c.,ee Corp . 682 1- 2d
I I. 1 I5 (911h Cir 1982); Schant, % While I ightming. 502 1'2d 67 (81h ('Cu- 1974). Super iol
()l % \Ierrill. 619 1 Supp 526. 529 (I) Utah 1985)
194 No 84-2460. 13 Indian I, Rep 2069 (8th Cit 198o
19'; Id ;li 2)7(.71 As for [he sovereign initin n%-stic. I ite I ih h (ircuit did not
icntlind I0 the Unilted Stlate I)islrici Court but presersed it Io be ad:es,..ed In the firi
in,lanke b% Ihe I rialai court Id ail 2071
No. 21
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The four cases mentioned above seem to establish a pattern
where federal question jurisdiction is the issue in a matter in-
volving a tribally created IHA. The typical scenario may involve
a non-Indian off-reservation contractor who voluntarily enters into
a contract with the Indian housing authority to construct housing
or perform other work on the reservation. If the contractor sucs
the IHA under their contract, National Farmer's Union, as inter-
preted by Weeks Construction Co., may mandate that the tribal
court hear the case in the first instance to interpret the contract
provisions at issue. If the losing party desires to file the matter
in federal court, not only must it exhaust all available tribal court
remedies (i.e., a final adjudicatioi on procedural or substantive
grounds), it also must sufficiently raise the issue of whether
the matter arises under federal law, in the context of the federal
question statute, before the federal court may take jurisdiction.
However, if the matter involves an issue peripheral to or not in-
volving any underlying construction contract, the number of
possibilities for a federal court asserting federal court jurisdiction
seemingly increase.
Situations where a pending tribal court matter is interrupted
by the filing of an action in federal district court is scrutinized
more carefully, however. In R. J. Williams Co., the Ninth Circuit
found that the Fort Belknap Tribal Court's writ of attachment
adequately raised the issue of whether it had exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, thus giving the court federal question jurisdiction. However,
plaintiff failed to exhaust its available tribal remedies by filing
an identical action in federal district court before the tribal court
had made a final decision. Such an attempt, not unlike forum
shopping, may compel the federal court to allow the tribal court
to first proceed to render a final decision.' 96
Diversity Jurisdiction
In order for a federal district court to have diversity jurisdiction
generally, not only must the parties be of diverse citizenship under
section 1332(a) of title 28 of the United States Code ("complete
196 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante. 107 S.Ct. 971, 977 (1987) ("at a mm-
imum. exhaustion of tribal remedies means that tribal appellate courts must have the
opportunity to revie the determination of the lower tribal courts"); A & A Concreie.
781 F 2d at 1415-17 (review of construction company's claims is premature due to company's
fatlure to exhaust its remedies tn tribal court, in light of National Farmers" Union. company
is not excused from die requirement based on tribal court's alleged lack of jurisdiction).
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diversity") and the issue in controversy exceed $10,000, but the courts
of the state in which the federal court sits also must be able to enter-
tain the matter.'" The Supreme Court has recently held that the
exhaustion of tribal remedies requirement of National Farmers'
Union applies to diversity situations as well as federal question
cases.' Thus, although the Court held that diversity jurisdiction
existed over a matter filed previously in the Blackfeet Tribal Court
concerning an insurance claim, the tribal court should first be given
full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction, including tribal
appellate court review of the lower court's determination.'"
An additional requirement attaches in matters involving Indians
and Indian tribes. Even if the complaint sufficiently discloses all
facts required to invoke diversity jurisdiction, such jurisdiction
will be precluded where state jurisdiction will impermissibly infringe
upon the Indians' right to self-government."' Thus, when a federal
court attempts to assert diversity jurisdiction over an Indian tribe
or a tribal entity, it must determine whether the state in fact has
taken affirmative steps to assume jurisdiction over tribes within
the state's boundaries.
A tribe's interest ii. self-government can be implicated in one
of two ways. First, the tribe's right to adjudicate disputes may
be impermissibly limited if a state or federal court seeks to resolve
a dispute properly and exclusively within the province of the tribal
court (i.e., the matter is purely an internal tribal matter or the
197 Woods v. Interstate Realty Company. 337 U.S. 535 (1949); R.J. Williams Co.,
719 V 2d at 982. The diversity jurisdiction statute states in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10.000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between-
(I) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . ..
(c For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title. a corporation shall
be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business
28 U S.C A. § 1332 (West Supp 1983, (emphasis added).
198 Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlanie. 107 SCt 971, 976-79 (1987),
I Q9 The Supreme Court clearly stated that regardless of the basis for jurisdiction, federal
policy ,upportnng tribal self-government requires federal courts, as a maiter of comity.
to ".sta' their hai.d" in order to give tribal courts full opportunity to consider the issues
b.forc them and rectify an. errors. 167 S.Ct. at 977 The Court also rejected the argument
thai tribal court bias or incompetence sered as a sufficient exception to the exhaustion
requirement.
200 Littel %,. Nakai. 344 F.2d 486. 489 (9th Cir. 1965). Weeks Constr. Co., 797 F.2d at
672-74. R J Williams Co.. 719 F.2d at 982: Kerr-McGee Corp.. 682 F.2d at 1317.
No. 21
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tribal code specifically addresses the issue)."' Second, if the subject
matter of the dispute itself calls into question "the validity or
propriety of an act fairly attributable to the tribe as a govern-
mental body," tribal self-government is drawn directly into the
controversy.' Although exclusive tribal jurisdiction can be altered
by express congressional action, the diversity jurisdiction statute
does not have this effect. '
Two Supreme Court decisions are instructive in this area. In
the 1938 case of Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins, °4 the Court held
that a federal court's diversity jurisdiction is derivative of the courts
of the state in which the federal court sits.'"' The Court reasoned
that to permit a nonresident party to maintain an action in the
federal courts through diversity jurisdiction, which could not be
maintained in the state courts, would work a gross discrimination
against state residents who could not avail themselves of diversity
jurisdiction.' Thus, if the plaintiff is barred from recovery in
state court, he should likewise be barred in federal court.
In the 1959 decision of Williams v. Lee,'° a non-Indian plaintiff
sued an Indian couple in an Arizona state court to recover for
goods sold on the Navajo Reservation. The Court unanimously
held that exclusive jurisdiction over the matter was vested in the
Navajo Tribal Court. In holding this to be an internal affair of
the tribe pursuant to an 1868 treaty with the United States, the
Court noted that "to allow the exercise of State jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the rights of the Indians to
govern themselves."' ° Thus, regardless of whether the federal court
possessed diversity jurisdiction, a matter properly before the tribal
court must be heard there in the first instance.
The Erie mandate, unlike the decision in Williams v. Lee, was
a "choice of law" directive rather than strictly a jurisdictional
201. R.J. Williams Co.. 719 F.2d at 983. See Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 US- at 65-66;
Fisher v. District Court. 42. U-S. 382. 387-88 (1976).
202 RJ. Williams Co . '19 F.2d at 983. see Luttel. 344 F 2d at 490
203. Iowa Mut. In-% Co . 10; S.Ct. at 977: Lmttel. 344 F 2d at -89-90
204 304 .S. 64 (1938)
205 Id. at 74-77.
206 Id. The tmin aim% of the Erie decision were "discouragemen: of forum-hopping
and the avoidance of inequitable admiistration or the lavs." Hanna % 'lumer. 380 U S
460. 468 (1965) See also Woods, 337 U S at 538
2)7 358 U.S 217 (195';)
208 Id at 223
[Vol. 13
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ruling. However, the federal courts, specifically the Eighth and
Ninth circuits, have read both decisions together in determining
whether a federal court has diversity jurisdiction over a lawsuit
involving Indians. The primary issue addressed by the two circuits
is whether, after the statutory requirements for diversity are met,
the factual situation before the district court constitutes purely
an internal tribal matter. The Eighth and Ninth circuits have specifi-
cally adopted the Williams v. Lee ruling as compelling upon diver-
sity actions involving Indians. 2 9
It is well settled that for "complete diversity" purposes a tribally
created IHA is a citizen of the state where the respective Indian
reservation is located." ' Thus the underlying issue concerning IHAs
is whether, after the statutory requirements have been met, all
the judicially created tests peculiar to diversity jurisdiction have
also been satisfied.
:n R. C. Hedreen Co. v. Crow Tribal Housing Authority,"'
the United States District Court for the District of Montana was
209 See Iittel v Nakai. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Hot Oil Serv.. Inc.
fHall. 366 F 2d 295 (9th Cir 1966) (the Ninth Circuit held that the Arizona state courts
wore wtthout di.crsit iurisdiction primarily because the incident occurred on tribal trust
land. necessaril involving reservation affairs wshich were within the exclusive province
of the tribal courts. Id at 297): Begay %, Kerr-McGee Corp.. 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.
1982) (in discussing Littel and Hot Oil. the court believed that both cases were better
understood %%hen viewed as "d-cisions construing section 1332(a) to preclude a non-Indian
plaintiff from obtaining Federal judicial resolution of a dispute which Williams v. Lee
vests in the tribe's exclusive jurisdiction." 682 F-2d at 1317, The court explicitly stated
that. consitent witth the Erie doctrine, the United States District Court's jurisdiction is
a creature of lederal la% pursuant to both article Ill of the Constitution and 28 U S C.
1332(a): thus. is the federal jurisdictional statute preempts any conflicting state law, state
law does not nor may not control or limit a United States District Court's diversity jurisdic-
tion Id. at 1315-17 The court effectively limited application of the Williams v. Lee ruling
to situations insolving a non-lndtan plaintiff and an Indian defendant)
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the holdings of I ittel and Hot Oil in the 1975 case
of Poitra v. Demarrias. 502 F2d 23 (8th Cir. 197-i). cert. denied. 421 U.S. 934 (1975),
Here the court determined that the Unted States l)istrict Court possessed diversity jurisdic-
tion in a wronglul death action brought bN one Indian against another, even though they
.ere both members of the same tribe and the tort occurred on the Standing Rock Indian
Reer'ation Fle court interpreted the iilliams s. Lee ruling to be limited to issues involving
interference witih tribal affairs In Potira. on the other hand. the court %%as confronted
vith "'one Indtan seeking to avail herself of the Federal court in an action against another
Indian." which in and of itself "'vsould seem to negate an% Itribal) interference claim that
could be made since no interfering outsiders are trying to toist jurisdiction on the Indians.'
't02 I 2d at 29
210 Veeks Cons r Co. 797 f 2d at 673. n.6: R.J. Williamns Co.. 719 F.2d at 982
n 2. R C Iledreen Co. 521 F. Supp. at 602-03
211 521 F Supp 599 (D Mont 1981).
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confronted for the first time with a diversity lawsuit involving
a tribally created IHA defendant. The plaintiff general contractor,
based in the state of Washington, sued the Montana-based IHA
for wrongful nonpayment of funds due under their construction
contract. In finding that it possessed diversity jurisdiction, the
court simply determined that the IHA was a "citizen" for purposes
of the diversity statute, without determining the effect that this
holding may have upon tribal sovereignty or self-government." 'i
However, in R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing
Authority, the Ninth Circuit rejected not only the Hedreen court's
legal analysis of diversity jurisdiction as it involved Indians but
also the district court's test to determine the business contacts made
by the IHA. Confronted with a factual setting almost identical
to Hedreen, the court found that although the parties were of
"complete diversity," ''  any federal court interpretation of the
tribal code provision would impermissibly trod upon the tribe's
"responsibility for self-government."-"" The question of whether
212. Id at 602-03. The court, in analogizing a tribal corporation to a general non-
Indian business corporation, discussed the legal effect of the sovereign immunity issue:
The reason prior court decisions have not expressly addressed the question of whether
a corporation chartered by the tribe is a citizen for diversity purposes is that the issue
is almost inseparable from the issue of sovereign immunity. To illustrate, under the
defendant's analysis it would be possible to conclude that the Housing Authority and/or
even the Crow Tribe has completely waived its sovereign immunity, yet nonetheless
cannot be sued in federal court since they are not "citizens" for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction. Both common sense and the legal practicalities of the commercial v
dictate a different result, Pegardless of the soveretgn source from which a corporate
entity derives its ciarter. when it is constituted with all of the required formalities
it comes into existence as a legal entity As a legal entity, it is susceptible to suit on
its contracts in any court of competent jurisdiction unless it enjoys some legal excuse.
c g . sovereign immunity.
The Hedreen case was settled out of court in 1981 before an appeal was heard before
the Ninth Circuit.
213 719 F.2d at 982-83 n.2.
214. Id. at 983. The court relied primarily on Wiiams v. Lee and its progeny in
determining that no diversity jurisdiction existed. The Ninth Circuit explained its reasoning
as follows:
In Littel v. Nakat, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965). this court iield that +',""ams also
had an impact on diversity actions brought in federal court. After we concluded that
Latel would have been precluded from suing in state court by Wilhiams v. Lee. we
noted that a federal court sitting in diversity operates as an adjunct to a state court
and should also be precluded from entertaining the action . We have recognized
that the tribal court is generally the exclusive forum for the adjudication of disputes
affecting the interests of both Indians and non-Indians which arise on the reservation
Snow v Quinault Indian Nation [citation omitted! - .Here. however, at the time of
the dispute there is some question of ,hether the tribe had excercised its right to assume
its exclusie jurisdiction. Fort Belknap Lay. and Order Code ch I. § 14,1 (1970). .taies
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the Fort Belknap Housing Authority was a "member" of the tribe,
pursuant to a tribal code provision defining tribal court jurisdiction,
should be answered in the first instance by the tribal court; there-
fore, the court of appeals refused to take diversity jurisdiction.2 '
Through R. J. Williams, the Ninth Circuit has adopted an addi-
tional test for diversity jurisdiction, based specifically upon Montana
state case law. This test scrutinizes the "significant contacts" made
by the IHA off the reservation in securing the construction con-
tract with the general contractor.2 ' The focus is to determine the
place where the dispute arose; if the district court finds that the
dispute arose on reservation lands (taking five factors into con-
sideration), state courts are without jurisdiction and, pursuant to
the Erie doctrine, the issue should be heard first by the tribal court.
If, however, a sufficient amount of business was transacted off
the reservation, the United States District Court may assert diver-
sity jurisdiction. 2 '"
that the tribal court has jurisdiction to hear suits in which the "defendant is a member
of the Fort Belknap Indian Community " The word "member" is not precisely defined
in the ordinance, and there remains a genuine question as to whether the Housing
Authority is contemplated within the jurisdictional statute. Interpretation of a tribal
ordinance is one of the duties of a tribal court
215 Id at 983
216. Id at 984-85.
217 Id. The United States District Court for the District of Montana initially applied
the Montana Supreme Court-based test in RC. Hedreen Co.. 521 F. Supp. 599 (D. Mont.
1981) The court found as dispositive certain "significant contacts" in holding that the
tribally created IHA had sufficiently "'gone off the reservation" to do business:
Since the Authority has voluntarily gone beyond reservation boundaries to transact
the business and negotiate the contracts at issue here. suit could also have been brought
in state court See Cravford v. Roy. 176 Mont. 227. 230-31. 577 P.2d 392. 393-94
(1978). see also the relevant discussion in Mescalero Apache Tribe r. Jones. 411 U.S.
145. 152-58. 93 S Ct 1267. 1272-76. 36 I_ Ed. 2d 114 (1973) Adequate substantial
contacts with the state are manifest: (I) the contracts were made with non.lndian entities
residing off the reservaton. (2) they contemplated the procurement of supplies and
labor off the reser'ation. (3) bids for the work were solicited off the reservation. (4)
the plaintiff executed the contracts off the reservation, and (5) the bond essential to
the contract, swas procured and signed off the reseration. In any event, this conclusion
does not 'infringe on the rights of Indians to make their o'wn laws and to be ruled
b, their own la." Craw]ord supra. 176 Mont. at 230; 577 P.2d at 394; W lliams
v Lee. 358 U S 217. 220. 79 S C. 269, 270. 3 L. Ed 2d 25' (1959): see also Duluth
Lt unher & Plywood i Delta Development. Inc.. 281 N W.2d 377. 382-83 (1979). particu.
larh since wec are dealing with a commercial transaction not confined to the reservation.
wshere the applicable tribal ordinance (authorized by the federal government) contains
an unqualified "sue or be sued" clause.
€21 I ,upp at 606W-7 n 4-
The Ninth Circuit. hovweer. expressly disagreed with the Ifedreen court's analysis in
R J Wi',lltun? C',. 719 F 2d at 981. inolving a factual setting almost identical to the
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The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit thus far to employ such
a test for diversity purposes. Two observations are made at this
juncture, however. First, state courts have applied a similar "sig-
nificant contacts" test for purposes of determining jurisdiction
in matters involving not only Indians but tribally created IHAs. t'
Second, a similar test has been employed by federal, state, and,
most recently, tribal courts in determining whether personal
jurisdiction exists over a defendant. 2 9
The Eighth Circuit applied substantial case law it had previously
rendered concerning Indian tribes to Weeks Construction Co.22 '
case before the Montana District Court. 719 F.2d at 985. The circuit modified the set
of factors applied to the situation: while the Hedreen court looked to the location of
the parties dealing with the IHA and the place where the contract was actually executed.
the circuit court focused instead on the location of the dispute itself:
We disagree with the [Hedreenl court's analysis. In determining the locus of a contract
dispute. courts generally look to (I) the place of contracting. (2) the place of negotia-
tion of the contract. (3) the place of performance. (4) the location of the subject matter
of the contract, and (5) the place of residence of the parties, evaluating each factor
according to its relative importance with respect to the dispute. Restatement (Second)
ot Conflict of Laws § 188(2) (1971). When a contract concerns a specific physical
thing. such as land or a chattel, the location of this ts regarded as highly significant
Id., § 188. comment e: see also. id-, § 189-191. Here, as in Hedreen. the contract
inolved housing to be built on the reservation. to be occupied by reservation members
atid paid for by an agency representing the tribe. We think these factors determine
the locus of the dispute. although workers. vupphe5. and the construction bond would
hate to come in from off the reservation There were thus no "substantial activities
vs.ing rise to a dispute' arising outside the reseration. In re Bertelson. 617 P 2d 121.
125 (Mont 1980) Thus. the '.ignificant contacts'" test is not met here- lEmphasl,
added I
2ls See Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. % Delta Dev.. Inc., 281 N.W.2d 377 (Mtnn
19791 I he Minnesota Supreme Court found that Minnesota state courts may assert jurisd,.-
tion oer essentially the same factual situation See infra te't accompany,ig notes 277-283
219 See infra the section on "Tribal Court Jurisdiction."
220 ll'eeks Constr Co . 797 F.2d at 674. citing Poitra v, Demarrias. 502 .,2d 23
(8th Cir 1974). cert denied. 421 U S 934 (1975) See also American Indian Nat'l Ban!
% Red Ov.l. 478 F Supp. 302 (DS D 1979) (the district court, in finding dtversit. jurisdic-
tion. noted that as the state court lacked jurisdiction oser the instant matter due to federal
li% rather than state policy, state citizens vsould not be subject to discrimination because
the tribal court sa, open to them. id. at 304-05): Tibbets % Turtle Mountain lousing
Auth , No A2-82-59 (D NA1) 1985) (plaintiff executor of the estate of a deceaed member
of the Turtle lountain Band of Chippe".a Indian% sued the IHA. alleging that it "built
lows .ost houing units that encroach on the land held in trust for deceased b)s the
United State%-") Di ersity was utilized as the sole ground for jurisdiction; in dismising
the action. the court cited bo:h Eighth and Ninth Ctrctnt case las% (especiall, Hot Oil
'%er, . Inc s Hall. 366 F-2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966)) because of the similarity of the fact
pattern as conrolhng The court esplaited as lollovs-
Uh question of vshcther the exercise of lurisdriion b% the federal district court on
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
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In Weeks, the court was faced with the same issue presented before
the Ninth Circuit in R. J. Williams, that is, whether the IHA was
a "member" of the tribe so as to subject it to the tribe's jurisdic-
tion. 2 ' The plaintiff contractor was a Montana corporation, while
the defendant IHA was located in South Dakota. The court deter-
mined that the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court should hear the matter
in the first instance in order not to infringe upon the sovereignty
of the Oglala Sioux Tribe; 2 in doing so, the circuit specifically
noted that the failure of the Montana Federal District Court to
complete its legal analysis in Hedreen was determinative in that
court's assertion of diversity jurisdiction. 211
The Tenth Circuit has not had an opportunity to interpret the
Williams-Erie doctrine where diversity and IHA matters are con-
cerned." '2 However, the Utah Federal District Court has applied
this line of reasoning in finding that diversity jurisdiction existed
in Brown v. Washoe Housing Authority. In Brown, the court was
reservation matters betv.een Indians would interfere with tribal self-government or tribal
affair,,. or vith considerations of tribal policy or customs is dependent upon the facts
and circumstances of each indi~idual case. Under the circumstances of this case its
disposition by the federal district court would necessarily in.olve reservation affairs
and affect the Tribe in its policy of providing low cost housing to tribal members.
The dispute should be resolved by the Tribe and the United States District Court should
not become involved except upon a showing of ,iolation of constitutional rights. See
25 U S.C- § 130215).
Slip op. at 2-3
221. 797 F.2d at 673
222 Id. at 674.
223 d. Said the court:
Because a grant of federal juridiction based on diversity would impinge on the tribe's
right to self.gosernment, the district court did not err when it refused to assume jurisdic-
tion and referred the case for an initial determination by the trital court of vhether
the Housing Authority is a member of the tribe.
224. But see American Indian Agric. Credit Consortium. Inc- %. Fredericks. 551 F.
'Stpp 1020 (D Colo. 1982) (the Colorado Federal District Court determined that Eighth
Circuit case k v, controlled where the matter did not involve a "purely internal tribal mat-
icr"), id at 1021 In contrast to Williams v. Lee. Hot Oil Serv . Inc.. and Littel. the
isje before the court %,.as "a transaction between an outside corporation and an individual
member of a tribe, acting solely :n his private capacity as signer of a promissory note
nov. in default " Id. Superior Oil Co. %. Merritt. 619 F Supp 526 (D Utah 1985).
%.here the Utah Federal DistriLt Court dismissed a lawsuit by an oil company for lack
oI di ersity jurisdiction based on IIahms v. Lee The court noted. ho.,eer. that a contrarn
holding might ha.e been possible if the plaintiff had asserted that the tribal court lacked
!unrldlicon oer the matter, pursuant to National Farmers" Union Ins. Co % Crow
- Tribe.
471 . S 845. 851 -52 n 12 (1985). or that it had been refused access to tribal courts. pursuant
to R I lliams Co . 719 F.2d at 981 See 619 F Supp. at 535 n 3.
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faced with the issue of whether the Nevada defendant IHA had
"transacted business" in Utah so as to be subject to state jurisdic-
tion under the Utah long-arm statute. The court found that, apply-
ing a liberal construction of the state statute, the IHA had suffi-
ciently conducted business with the plaintiff Utah construction
company to subject itself to the jurisdiction of that forum.2'
It is apparent from a close reading of the above case law that
all three circuits are consistent in applying the Williams-Erie deci-
sions. The federal district court must justify a finding of diversity
jurisdiction, after finding that the statutory requirements have been
met, not only upon the fact that the state' court had previously
or could have assumed jurisdiction over the matter but that in-
terference with tribal jurisdiction would be minimal. Thus it
is apparent that the federal courts may be inclined to assert jurisdic-
tion where the IHA is the plaintiff, going beyond the bounds of
the reservation in order to resolve a dispute.
The Indian Civil Rights Act
It is not seriously questioned that the protection afforded by
the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights does not
apply to Indian tribes, tribal agencies, and tribal officials.2 26 Con-
gress has modified this, acting pursuant to its plenary power, by
enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to ensure that indi-
vidual Indians receive certain due process protection in tribal
courts.22
The Indian Civil Rights Act applies to both Indian and non-Indian
individuals while on the Indian reservation. 2 ' However, a specific
provision of the Act restricts federal court jurisdiction over alleged
225- 625 F Supp, at 599. The court stated its reasoning as follows:
Washoe supplied information to a trade journal that is located in Utah and that services
Utah contractors Washoe supplied plaintiff with bid information, sent plaintiff a HUD-
approved contract for plaintiff's signature and sent plaintiff a copy of the executed
contract Other mail and wire correspondence occurred to and from Washoe. in and
out of the State of Utah. Although modern modes of communication obviated the need
for Washoe actually to enter this State to transact business, the transaction of business
no less occurred despite the absence of Washoe's physical presence. It is clearly the
case that Washoe directed its business activities to residents of this state and that those
activities affected persons or businesses within this state sufficient to satisfy the Istate
long-arml statute.
226 DuBray. 565 F Supp. at 465. See generally Santa Clara Pueblo. 436 U.S. at
56 n 7. Talton v Mayes. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
227 25 U S C §§ 1301.1341 (1982).
228. Schantz, 502 F.2d at 70 n.5; R.J. Williams Co. 719 F 2d 979 n.4. Dodge v
Nalai, 298 F Supp 17, 24.25 (D_ Ariz 1968).
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civil rights violations to habeas corpus proceedings. 2" It is clear
that responsibility to enforce the provisions of the Act, including
matters involving tribally created IHAs, rests primarily with the
tribal courts. 3 0
Concerning tribally created IHAs, two other interrelated barriers
exist before a federal district court may hear any matter involving
an IHA defendant. First, the lawsuit must be based on a "contract,
claim or obligation" in order to avoid the issue of sovereign im-
munity.2 "' Second, it is well settled that an action alleging breach
of contract does not involve a deprivation of individual constitu-
tional civil rights.2 "
The majority of lawsuits filed in federal district court against
tribally created IHAs were dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction. 3
In one situation, however, the lawsuit was dismissed because the
court found that the IHA had not waived its sovereign immunity
concerning an Indian civil rights action.2 " '
Thus, in avoiding the hurdle of a tribally created IHA's sovereign
immunity, the plaintiff must base its cause of action upon breach
or other action founded in a contract, claim, or obligation. Yet,
229. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982) See Weatherwax v. Fairbanks. No. CV-85-159-GF. 12
Indian L. Rep. 3173 (D. Mont. 1985). where the mere challenge of a tribal court judgment
that determined certain visitation rights in a child custody case did not amount to a habeas
corpus proceeding.
230 For example, see Lawrence v Southern Puget Sound Inter-Tribal Housing Auth.,
Nos. CV-860002 and 860003. 14 Indian L Rep. 6011 (Suq. Tr. Ct. 1987). where the
Suquamish Tribal Court held that a tribal member's tenancy in a Southern Puget Sound
Inter-Tribal Housing Authority's (SPSITHA) Mutual Help unit is a property right entitled
to the due process protections of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341
11982). and. further, that her civil rights were violated when the SPSITHA failed to follow
the rules of its own grievance procedure. See 24 C.F.R. § 905.303 (1986).
231. See Ordinance. supra note 56. art V, § 2.
232. Schubert Constr.. 490 F. Supp. at 1010; Hickey v. Crow Creek Housing Auth..
379 F Supp. at 1003.
233. See R.J. Williams Co., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983); DuBray v. Rosebud Housing
Auth.. No. CIV-83-01, 12 Indian L. Rep. 6015 (Rbd. Sx. Tr. Ct. 1985) (Rosebud Tribal
Court holds that Rosebud IHA did not waive sovereign immunity in civil rights action
for wrongful termination of plaintiffs' employment by the IHA). See also Schubert Constr..
490 F Supp. 1008 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (federal district court had no jurisdiction in civil rights
action ansing solely from an Indian housing construction contract); Wilson v. Turtle Moun-
tain Band of Chippewa Indians & Turtle Mountain Housing Auth., 459 F. Supp. 366,
168-69 (D.N.D, 1978) (federal district court had no jurisdiction in civil rights action by
a nonmember former tenant of the IHA in a turnkey housing project); Hickey v. Crow
Creek Housing Auth., 379 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.D. 1974) (damages action arising from
well-drilling contract on Indian housing project).
234 See Wilson and DuBray cases, supra note 233 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court
diimisses the action based on sovereign immunity).
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the federal courts may not take jurisdiction over an action alleging
Indian Civil Rights Act violations where the cause of action is
based solely upon contract.
An "absolute necessity" exception has been carved out of the
statutory limitation to habeas corpus procecdings by the Tenth
Circuit."' However, the Montana Federal District Court explicitly
rejected application of this exception to construction disputes in-
volving tribally created IHAs in R. J. Williams Co. " " It will suffice
at this juncture to state that, as current case law has dictated,
federal courts most likely will not hear actions against tribally
created IHAs based solely on violation of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.
State Court Jurisdiction
When a state court attempts to exercise jurisdiction over a matter
involving an IHA, three factors must exist before jurisdiction will
be granted. First, it must be ascertained whether the IHA was
organized under state law or created by tribal ordinance. In addi-
tion, a state may not exercise jurisdiction either where there exists
incompatible federal legislation or regulations, or where such juris-
diction would otherwise interfere with the tribe's right to
self-government.
Applicability of State Regulatory Schemes
Incident to the question of federal court jurisdiction over Indian
issues is when state courts also may invoke their jurisdiction, in-
herently or by specific statute. In deciding when a state court has
jurisdiction over factual situations involving Indians and Indian
tribes, federal courts look not only to whether the Indian party
is plaintiff or defendant but also to the extent to which state
jurisdiction will infringe upon tribal self-government.
In sharp contrast to Chief Justice Marshall's initial recognition
of the importance and qualities of tribal self-government,"' "Con-
235 Dry Creek Lodge. Inc- % United States. 515 F2d 926 (lOth Cir 1975). rcdeignated
Dry Creek Lodge. Inc. v Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes. 623 F,2d 682 (00th Cir. 1980).
cert dented. 449 US. 1118. reh. denied. 450 U.S. 960 (the Court distinguished Santa
Clara not only because no tribal remedies or other relief were asailable in tribal court.
but the defenwe of tribal sosereign immunity disappeared "hen the issue iclated to a mailer
not exclusisely an internal tribal affair).
236. 509 F Supp. 933. 940-41 (D. Nlont. 1981). rev'd on other grounds. 719 F.2d
979 (9th Cir. 1983) (the Montana Federal District Court felt itselt hound bN prior Ninth
Circuit case la, in rejecting the holding of Dry Creek Lodge).
237 Worcester. 31 U.S. at 561.
[Vol. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol13/iss2/2
HUD INDIAN HOUSING PROGRAMS
gress has to a substantial degree opened the doors of reservations
to State laws.""' Although "federal treaties and statutes have
been consistently construed to reserve the right of self-government
to the tribes," 2 " recent Supreme Court decisions have established
a trend "away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as
a bar to State jurisdiction and toward a reliance on Federal pre-
emption." ' The Court has employed by its own admission a
preemption analysis "that is informed by historical notions of tribal
sovereignty rather than determined by them." '
Two separate tests sharply limit the assertion of state authority
on Indian reservations. First, state authority may be preempted
by conflicting federal statute." ' A basic tenet of American Indian
law is that tribal sovereignty is dependent solely upon, and subordi-
nate only to, the federal government; it exists only because of
the recognition given to it by Congress and is "subject to complete
defeasance" by congressional action.14 1
Under the supremacy clause, federal law may supersede state
law in several different ways. First, when acting within constitu-
tional limits, Congress is empowered to preempt state law by so
stating in express terms. " ' Second, Congress' intent to preempt
may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is "suffi-
ciently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for supplementary State regulation. 4 ' Third,
federal preemption can be inferred where the field is one in which
"the Federal interest is so dominant that the Federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of State laws on the same
subject."" State law will also be nullified to the extent that it
actually conflicts with federal law. Federal regulations, including
238 Rehner. 463 U.S at 718. quoting Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U S
60. 74 (1962).
239 Rehner. 463 U., at 718. quoting F COHEN,. supra note 59, at 273,
240 Rehner. 463 U S at 718. quoting McClanahan %. Arizona Tax Comm'n. 411
U S_ 16. 172 (1973).
241 Rehner. 463 U.S. at 718 In deciding '"hen a state court has jurisdiction o.er
factual 'ituations involving Indians and Indian tribe,, lederal courts look not onl% to 'hether
the Indian party is plaintiff or defendant but the extent to 'shich state jurisdiction %i.l
iniringe upon tribal self-government. See infra note 250
242 rhree Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reser-,ation v %Vold Eng'g. 467 U S.
13S. I-17 (1984)
2.13 Rehner. 463 U.S. at 718. quoting Wheeler. 435 U S. ai 323.
244: Hillsborough County %, Automated Med Labs_. Inc.. 471 U.S 707. 713 (19S5)
24 ld . quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Ele, Corp . 331 U.S 218. 23(1 (947)
216 /i See Captat Cities Cable. Inc % Crisp. 467 U.S. 691. 699 (1984). quoting
I idclhi Fed Sa, & Loan A,'n % De La Cuesta. 458 U.S 141. 153-154 (1982).
No. 21
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1988
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
HUD's regulations found at 24 C.F.R. part 905, have the same
preemptive effect as federal statute.2"7
Second, exercise of state authority may be foreclosed because
it would undermine the right of reservation Indians to govern them-
selves.2"' This limitation is being sharply diminished in scope, how-
ever; a growing body of case law indicates that states generally
have authority over non-Indians in Indian country unless there
is a conflict with federal law. 249 The effects of the apparent shift
in the law is most evident in matters where a state attempts to
impose taxes on Indians or Indian entities, located on or off the
reservation; the Supreme Court has faced this issue many times
in the last two decades.2"0
Even if the state has not assumed or been delegated civil and/or
criminal jurisdiction over the tribes within its boundaries, the lack
of such action does not absolutely preclude a state from exercising
such jurisdiction. 2" States also possess inherent "residuary"
authority over non-Indians in Indian country unless there is a con-
flict with federal law." ' On the state's assumption of jurisdiction
247. Hillsborough County. 471 US. at 713. See United States _ Shimer, 367 U.S.
374. 381-83 (1961).
248 Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S at 147.
249. State ex rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe. Nos. 66074-75. 12 Indian L. Rep.
5085. 5090 and n.42 (Okla. 1985). The Oklahoma Supreme Court indicated that the areas
of natural resources and taxation were especially subject to state jurisdiction See Smith
Plumbing Co v. Aetna Cas & Sur Co.. No. 17691-PR. 13 Indian L_ Rep 5055 (Ariz.
1986)
250, Thus the Court has determined the following: state could not tax the gross proceeds
of sales or gross income of a corporation doing business on the reservation (Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n. 380 US. 685 (1965)). state could tax the gross receipts
of an Indian corporation located off the reservaton (Mescalero Apache Tribe %. Jones.
411 U S. 145 (1973)); state could not tax the income of tribal members earned on the
reservation (McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. 172 (1973)), state could
tax an Indian smoke shop's materials sold to non-Indians on the reservation (Moe v. Con-
federated Salish & Kootenai Tribes. 425 U.S. 463 (1976)): state could not impose its motor
carrier tax and excise fuel tax on a non-Indian logging contractor hired by the tribe for
on-reservation logging activities (Whrte Mountain Apache Tribe % Bracker. 448 U S. 136
(1980)); and state could impose a sales tax on cigarettes sold b, Indians to nonmembers
on the reservation (Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation. 447 U S
135. 155-57 (1980)). See supra notes 209. 214.
251 Three Affihated Tribes. 467 U.S at 155-57. State exs rel. Iron Beat s District
Court. 512 P.2d 1292. 1296-98 (Mont 1973).
252. Id. See also United States s. McGowan. 302 U.S. 535 (1938). Draper United
States. 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S 621 11882) 5ee generally
F COHE., supra note 59. at 348-61. In Little Horn State Bank v. Stops. 170 Mont. 510.
555 P 2d 211 (1976). cert. denied, 411 U.S. 924 (1977). a bank sought to levy upon certain
property owned by Indians who had borrowed money from the bank. The bank wa, located
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under its residuary powers, the state police power is automatically
operative in the absence of congressional action; the state itself
has the power to define its jurisdictional limits, subject to the
twin limitations of interference with tribal sovereignty and incom-
patible federal legislation."'
Several Supreme Court decisions provide guidance regarding
the limitations upon residuary state jurisdiction over Indian matters
arising on an Indian reservation. The issue in Williams v. Lee
was interference with tribal sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdic-
tion." ' Thus, where a non-Indian sued an Indian in state court
to recover the cost of goods sold on the Navajo Reservation, the
state was foreclosed from exerting jurisdiction. The Court went
on to note that the absence of affirmative state or federal action
granting the state jurisdiction was compelling in making its decision. "
In Kennerly v. District Court,""6 a suit was initially commenced
in the state courts based on essentially the same factual situation
as in Williams v. Lee. The non-Indian plaintiffs in this situation,
however, asserted that a tribal code provision that purported to
give the state concurrent jurisdiction over the instant matter was
applicable. The Court rejected this argument, holding that this
unilateral tribal action was insufficient to give Montana jurisdiction
without some appropriate affirmative action by the state.2' Follow-
and the transaction occurred outside of the reservation. The Montana Supreme Court held
that the state court had jurisdiction, noting that.
rhe crucial fact of this appeal is that the subject matter jurisdiction lies with the State
court. not the tribal court, In this case the tribal members elected to leave the reservation
and conduct their affairs kthin the jurmsdlicion of the State courts. When they do
so they are submitting themselves to the laws of this State, They cannot violate those
laws and then retreat to the sanctuary of the reservation for protection.
Id. S55 P 2d at 214
25.1. Organized Village of Kake. 369 U.S. at 75 n.32. Jicarilla Apache Tribe 6. Unted
States. 601 1' 2d 1116. 1135 (10th Cir ). cert. dented, 444 IU S 995 (1979). quoting
Mescalero Apache Tribe. 411 U.S. at 148.
254 358 U S 217 (1959),
255. Concerning the fact situation before it. the Court noted that.
No Federal Act has given state courts jurisdiction over such controersies In a general
statute Congress did express its s,lhngness to have any State assume jurisdiction over
reservation Indians if the State I egislature or the people sole affirmatively to accept
such responsibility. To date. Arizona has not accepted jurisdiction. possibly because
the people of the State anticipate that the burdens accompanying such power might
be considerable
Id at 222-23
256 4(X) U S. 423 (1971)
257 Id at 424-27 In addition, the Court determined that,
The tribal consent that is prerequisite to the as,,umption of state jurisdiction under
the provisions (i Title IV of the Act 125 U S (.A §§ 1326 (1983)1 must be manifested
No. 21
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ing Williams v. Lee, the Court directed that the case be remanded
with the direction that it be heard first by the tribal court. " '
In direct contrast to the factual setting in Williams and Kennerly,
however, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation
v. Wold Engineering"' involved an Indian tribe seeking the juris-
diction of the state courts to settle a dispute with a nonreservation
contractor who had performed work on the reservation. The
Supreme Court remanded the case to the North Dakota Supreme
Court with the instruction that the state courts could not refuse
to take jurisdiction simply because the tribe had not previously
consented to such jurisdiction under relevant provisions of the
Indian Civil Rights Act. :" In other words, that the tribe had not
consented to imposition of state jurisdiction under the Act did
not per se foreclose it from suing in state court. The Court itself
acknowledged in passing that it has repeatedly "approved the exer-
cise of jurisdictio.n by State courts over claims by Indians against
non-Indians, even when those claims arose in Indian country." '
However, as the Court pointed out, different interests are impli-
cated when a non-Indian sues an Indian in state court resulting
from a similar transaction occurring in Indian country. 2
Federal legislation aso has been enacted to facilitate state assump-
tion of general civil and criminal matters. The majority of this
legislation was a direct result of the congressional termination policy
in effect during the 1950s. " '
The federal statute with the greatest impact upon tribally created
IHAs is known as Public Law 280. '" In 1953, Congress delegated
b% iu.jorit vote of the enrolled Indians s.ulthtin the alfecied area of Indian countr
I egisa.tie acion by the Tribal ( ouncil does, not comport %kith the exphcu requirements
ol [tic Act.
Id a1 429
258 Id
259 467 U S 138 (1994)
260 Id at 149-51 On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that Indian
Irihes ma'. properly bring s.uch a itu in tate court pros ided they accept cisil juridiction
purutant to the tate Indian Cii l Juridction AXct. sshich allosss assumption of general
state ,iitfl jurisdtction "itth approsal by the Indian people The court noted that such jurisdic-
tion min alo be wtthdrjss n pursuant to sidle lasw
2hl hil ai J8 See AlcClanahan. 411 U S a 171. Poafpsbuit% %keth Oil Co_
190 I N _165 (1968). Wlldiams. 358 U S at 219 tdikturn). united States % Candelaria.
271 L S 432. 444 (1926): I-ehi % Patrick. 14 t S 317. 332 (1892)
2b2 467 IU S at 148
261 ee H R Co% R s., lO .83d ( otig . It Ses . 67 Siat 11132 (1953); Wikitson
& IBigs. The Eiohtlort of the Tertrnation Pohi . ' -\si i' ." 1. 1 Rt-' 131) (1979)
264 18 L'C 1162 (1982). 25 t S ( k 1121-26 t1983 & Supp Ill 1985). and
28 * ( 1 1 tIM) (1978)
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to five (later six) states certain civil and criminal jurisdiction to
regulate affairs on Indian reservations." ' Public Law 280 extends
to all other states the option of assuming civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion of Indian reservations within their boundaries. A 1968 amend-
ment to Public Law 280 now requires tribal consent before such
jurisdiction may be asserted.""
The Supreme Court has noted that Public Law 280 was primarily
intended to "redress the lack of adequate Indian forums for
resolving private legal disputes between reservation Indians, and
between Indians and other private citizens, by permitting the courts
of the States to decide such disputes." 2 ' There is nothing in the
statute resembling an intention to confer general state civil
regulatory control over Indian reservations.' There is also
"notably absent any conferral of State jurisdiction over the tribes
themselves." 2 ' The grant of state jurisdiction is thus intended
to cover only the private civil disputes of individual reservation
Indians, as determined on a case-by-case basis.
265 California. Minnesota (except the Red Lake Reservation). Nebraska. Oregon (except
the Warm Springs Resersation). and Wisconsin (except the Menominee Reservation). 18
U S C. § 1162(a) (1982) and 28 U S.C § 1360(a) (1978). Jurisdiction was later conferred
upon the Menominee Reservation and the Alaska Territory. later the state of Alaska. Id See
Act of Aug. 24. 1954. ch. 910. § 2. 68 Stat- 795-6. For a listing as to vhich states have
accepted partial jur:,dictuon under Public La%, 280. see F. CoHEN'. supra note 59. at 362-63
n 125.
The United States is authorized to accept a retrocession of any or all jurisdiction previous-
Ih assumed bs, a state oer certain or all Indian tribes ssithtn that state's borders 25 U.S.C.
1323 (1983 & Supp I1 1985) The federal go.crnment is not compelled to accept such
jurisdiction based solely upon the state's unilateral action. See Omaha Tribe %,. Village
of Walthill. 460 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir 1972). cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1107
Publtc Lasw 280 expressly rejects any theory that it authorizes the alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property belonging to any Indian or Indian
tribe and held in trust by the United States. 25 U S.C. § 1322(b) (1983 & Supp. Il 1985).
It likevise grants no authority to confer jurisdiction upon the state to adjudicate, in probate
proceedings or othervise. ossnership or possessory interests in such property. Id. **Real
or personal property'" as defined by this statute may reasonably be interpreted to include
Indian housing and land (held in trust or as an allotment) that are insol.ed in Indian
houing program%
266. 25 U.S C 1326 (1983 & Supp III 1985). Pursuant to this statute (part of the
Indian Ciil Rights Xct). the enrolled adult tribal members vsithin the aflected area of
Indian country must accept state jurisdiction b, a majority %oie at a special election called
bs the Secretary of the Interior. the tribal council, or 20 percent of the enrolled adult
member,,
267 Bryan %, Itasca Counts. 426 U.S. 373. 383 (1976).
268 Id at 384-85 See I R_ REP No 848. 83o Cong.. Is, Sess 3 (1953).
269 426 U S at 3,8-89 See 25 U S ( § 1322(c) (1983 & Supp- III 1985).
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Public Law 280 is not a general waiver of the sovereign immu-
nity of either the tribe or the semigovernmental entity the tribe
creates, including an IHA.2 '0 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has recently emphasized that nothing in Public Law 280 purports
to authorize states to disclaim any preexisting state jurisdiction
it otherwise acquired over Indian tribes within the state."'
Understanding the limitations of residuary state authority is the
key to resolving the legal effect of Public Law 280 in a specific
state jurisdiction. The state itself has the power to define its
jurisdictional limits, subject to certain limitations as discussed else-
where in this article. Assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to Public Law 280 only facilitates the state's ability to
exercise jurisdiction over Indian matters.2 '2
Congress additionally recognized the need to preserve federal
jurisdiction over Indian tribes from state interference. The enabling
legislation that created many states between 1889 and 1959 con-
tained a provision in each state constitution expressly disclaiming
state jurisdiction over Indian lands within that state's boundaries."'
However, as Cohen points out in his treatise, "as a general matter
,hese clauses were not necessary, since the Supreme Court has
sustained the same Federal and tribal authority in States admitted
without such clauses.''
The Supreme Court has mandated that an asserted bar to juris-
diction over Indian lands based on the respective state constitution
is "a question of State law over which the State courts have binding
authority." 2"' Federal statute also provides that the people of any
state allegedly bound by such a state constitutional provision or
270 Charle, v Washington. No C-83-183-JLQ. II Indian L. Rep. 3043 (E.D. Wash.
1984). Atkinson v. Haldane. 569 P.2d at 163-67.
271 Three Affihated Tribes. 467 U.S. at 150-55
272 rhe effect of Public Law 280 upon residuary state authority to assert civil and
criminal jurisdiction over Indians is perhaps best witnessed in the area of high-stakes gam-
bling on Indian reservations See 18 U S.C §§ 13. 1152. 1955 (Supp. 11 1984); California
% Cabazon Band of Mission Indians. 107 & Ct 1083 (1987)
273 See F COHF.N. supra note 59. at 268 nn.69-72 The enabling act disclaimers were
effei'.el, remo,,ed through passage of Public Law 280 Seneca-Cayuga Tribe. 12 Indian
L Rep at 5090-91 nn 47-52 An' siale constitution that still contains a disclaimer provision
must be given effect to the extent legally possible. ihe issue remains whether the state
muit take affirmatie action. legislatl"e or otherwise, to remose it
274 F COr;N. supra note 59. at 268
275 Three Affihiated Tribes. 467 U S at 151. quoting Arizona '. San Carlos Apache
'r-he. 463 U.S 545. 561 (1983)
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state statute may amend either enactment as necessary to remove
such an impediment to jurisdiction. :"I
Duluth Lumber & Plywood Co. v. Delta Development, Inc.
The effect of Public Law 280 and corresponding state jurisdic-
tion over a tribally created IHA has been addressed only once and
that by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Duluth Lumber & Plywood
Co. v. Delta Development, Inc."' In Duluth, a non-Indian material-
man sued his general contractor and the Bois Forte Reservation
Housing Authority for lumber furnished to a Indian housing pro-
ject located on a Minnesota Indian reservation. The court disposed
of the sovereign immunity issue by holding that waiver by the
IHA to assumption of state jurisdiction occurred at the time the
tribal council enacted the Model Tribal Ordinance."' The court then
proceeded to the primary issue of "whether the State courts would
adversely affect the Chippewa Tribe's self-government by assuming
jurisdiction over a civil dispute involving monies disbursed by the
Housing Authority." ''
The court decided that asserting jurisdiction over the matter
would not significantly affect the tribe's self-government, citing
two reasons; not only was Minnesota one of the mandatory Public
Law 280 states but execution of the construction contract by the
IHA, HUD, and the general contractor evidenced the IHA's intent
to do business off the reservation.280
As assumption of state jurisdiction did not interfere with the
Fond Du Lac Reservation Indians' right "to make their own laws
and be ruled by them" (distinguishing Williams v. Lee), the primary
issue was interpretation of the contract in question rather than tribal
276 25 USC § 1324 (1983 & Supp III 1985)
277. 281 N W.2d 377 (Minn- 19"'9)
278. Id at 383-84
279 N at 382-83
280 Id In distinguishing Hicke,, . Crow Creek Housing Auth,. 379 F. Supp 1002
(D S D 19741. the court ncted that not onl, did the Crow Creek Indian Reseratnon ha,,e
it,, own tribal court, but the applicable Cto%% (reek tribal ordinance gase the tribal court
"original juridiction over Indians in all matters c1f a civil nature - Id- at 383 The Fond
Du Lac Indian Resersation. on the other hand. did not ha.e a tribal court, the tribal
,ode also did not have the provisions mentioned above
I h. court utilized a three-step analysis First. the state %%as one of the mandatory Public
[ a% 280 states Second. the court It that assumption of state jurisdiction would not
interlere with tribal %elf-gosernmenr Third. the IHA went off the resersation to secure
a general contractor to construct housing on the reser'ation 281 N.W.2d at 380-83-
No. 2]
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sovereignty. In affirming .adgment for the plaintiff on a third-party
beneficiary theory, the court analogized the situation to one in-
volving construction work on public property, regardless of whether
the Indian entity was involved.2"'
First, it is clear that the Duluth court relied on the state's affir-
mative assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280, prior
to institution of the Duluth lawsuit, in finding that state jurisdiction
existed. The state's failure to do so may have barred such jurisdic-
tion based on Williams v. Lee. State assumption of jurisdiction
pursuant to Public Law 280 may thus be a significant factor to
be scrutinized by a state court in deciding whether to assert jurisdic-
tion over a matter involving a tribally created IHA defendant.
It is interesting to note that this reasoning may in turn be com-
pelling upon federal district courts where diversity jurisdiction is
at issue, as assertion of state court jurisdiction over the same matter
is to be considered in determining whether diversity jurisdiction
exists.
Second, the Duluth court closely scrutinized the IHA's business
activities with the general contractor, specifically holding that the
IHA sufficiently went "off the reservation" to permit state jurisdic-
tion over the matter. The court utilized the same line of Montana
case law that formed the basis of the "significant contacts" test
used by the Ninth Circuit in R. J. Williams four years later. 22
Although essentially the same factual setting and legal issue was
presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit,
and the same case law was used by both courts as the test for
determining the contacts made by the tribally created IHA, the
281 Id at 184-86 The court presented its analysis as follos:
This discussion indicates that if construction work is performed on public property
that is exempt from a mechanic's lien. then promises in the contract concerning payment
of materialmen will be deemed to be for the benefit of the materialmen because the
public owner does not need protection against a mechanic's lien and because of the
inju,tice which would otherwise be suffered by the materialmen that have no lien rights.
Such reaoning supports recovery under the particular facts of this case. The
matertalman. Duluth Lumber. has no mechanic's lien because it does not attach to
the property of the Untied States or the Indian Housing Authority. Thus, either the
United States nor the Housing Authority needs protection against a mechanic's lien.
and the contractual provision inserted b% HUD requiring that the materialmen be paid
before the Housing Authority makes final pameni to the contractor can reasonabl%
be interpreted as to benefit the materialman
Id at 385
2X2 N. at 382 Set, R.1 Whlliuns Co . 719 F.2d at 984-85. See supra text accompanlng
noct: 21-219 and note 252
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two courts reached opposite holdings.2" Thus, a difference of opin-
ion among the states is evident as to what constitutes the IHA's
"significant contacts" in securing a prime contractor to construct
housing on the reservation.
Tribal Court Jurisdiction
Pursuant to the concept of tribal sovereignty, which is based
on the inherent powers of tribal government, on applicable pro-
visions of the United States Constitution and on such guidelines
provided by the Supreme Court," '3 Indian tribes with powers of
self-government generally are free to enact a tribal code to govern
the actions of individuals and entities located on their reservation.2"'
These tribes also may create a tribal court system to settle disputes
arising on the reservation.
The Supreme Court has determined that a tribal court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction over a non-Indian trading post proprietor's attempt
to collect a debt from a reservation Indian for goods sold from
the proprietor's store located on the reservation 2 1 and over an
adoption proceeding where all the parties were tribal members
residing on the reservation.2 3 ' The Court has also mandated that
tribal courts may assume civil jurisdiction over non-Indians who
enter "consensual relationships" with the tribe or its members
if the cause of action arose on the reservation."8 ' However, absent
283. The legal issues differed somewhat between the cases. In Duluth, the state
court was faced with a simple breach of contract action; in R.J. Williams Co., however.
the Ninth Circuit's primary issue concerned the tribal court's issuance of a writ of attachment
on the plaintiff's construction equipment. Although both courts relied upon the same
Montana case law, the state court found that it had jurisdiction, while the Ninth Circuit
did not, on the basis that assertion of diversity jurisdiction would interfere with tribal
sovereignty. It also appears that, in rejecting the Hedreen court's analysis of diversit,
and "significant contacts," the court of appeals interpreted the Montana case law differently
from the lower court. In any event, it is possible that if Montana was a Public Law 280
state, the holding in R.J. Williams Co. may have changed. See supra text accompanying
notes 213-219.
284. See supra the section. "Tribal Sovereignty in General." and notes 37-53. and "Ap-
plicability of State Regulatory Schemes" and notes 237-276.
285. See, e.g., R.J. Williams Co., 719 F 2d at 982 (the Ninth Circuit rejects plaintiff's
argument that the tribal court's use of Montana case law was equivalent to a relinquishment
of tribal sovereignty).
286. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
287. Fisher v. District Court. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
288 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S 544 (1981).
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congressional legislation, tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians for criminal offenses committed in Indian
country."'
Tribal court jurisdiction over matters brought to the court's
attention commonly is determined by the jurisdictional statements
in the tribal code; if the tribal code does not specifically address
the immediate issue, the court is free to adopt any applicable federal
or state common law guidelines in determining whether to assert
jurisdiction.
Where tribally created IHAs are concerned, both the Crow and
the Rosebud Sioux tribal courts have adopted the same two
Supreme Court-established tests in 1986 for determining whether
personal jurisdiction existed over the matter."' First, the courts
applied the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe v.
Washington,"' which requires that a defendant, if not present
within the forum, have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice" before the defendant
can be subjected to a judgment in personam.' 92 The International
Shoe standard normally is utilized by federal and state courts as
a due process (fourteenth amendment) safeguard."'
The Supreme Court recently stated in Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz' 9 that a contract between an out-of-state resident and
a forum resident alone cannot serve as a basis for personal jurisdic-
tion. 2"' The Court listed four factors that must be evaluated in
addition to the execution of the contract in determining whether
the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts within
the forum.""
289 Oliphant '. Suquamish Indian Tribe. 435 U S, 191 (1978). See Vational Fartner's
U'nion. 471 U S. at 853-57. in which the Supreme Court clearly rejects any application
of Oliphant to civil disputes
290 Crow% Tribal Housing Auth. % Little Horn State Bank. No 85-294. 13 Indian
I Rep 6029 (Crow Tr Ct 1986); Rosebud Housing Auth . Laf reek Elec Coop_
Inc . No- CIV-85-375. 13 Indian I Rep 6030 (Rbd. Sx. Tr Ct. 1986)
291 126 US 310 (1945)
292 Id. at 316
293 For a recent discussion ol application of the International Shoe ,tandard. see
Brown v Washoe Housing Auth . 625 F Supp. at 599-601
294 471 US 462 (1985)
295 Id at 478
296 The Court stated;
I he [Suprettel Court tong ago rejected the notion that personal jurisdiction might
turn on "mechanical tests.'* International Shoe v. Washington. 326 U.S at 319. 66
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Second, the two tribal courts also have applied the consensual
relationship test for tribal court jurisdiction, first established in
Montana v. United States.2"'
In Crow Tribal Housing Authority v. Little Horn State Bank,29
the plaintiff IHA filed suit in the Crow Tribal Court alleging that
the defendant bank had wrongfully dishonored a letter of credit
drawn by the defendant as assurance of performance and payment
for the IHA's development project. The court, while determining
that the letter of credit must be dealt with independently of the
underlying construction contract, applied the two tests mentioned
above. Concerning International Shoe, the court noted that the
only "contact" that the defendant had with the IHA was execution
and delivery of the letter of credit itself.'99 As for the Montana
test, the court noted:
[C]onsidered apart from the underlying construction agreement
and its resulting problems, the activities of Little Horn State
Bank, specifically the issuance of its letter of credit, do not
meet the consensual business transaction requirements set forth
in United States v. Montana, supra. . . . In this instance, the
court finds that the bank's only on-reservation contact in this
matter is the delivery of the letter of credit. This contact is inci-
dental and insufficient for the tribe to exercise jurisdiction based
upon a legitimate interest concerning the on-reservation activities
of this non-Indian, the Little Horn State Bank.
While these matters do affect a legitimate tribal interest in
the health and welfare of the Crow Indian Tribe, also a part
S C at 159. or on -conceptualistic theories of the place of contracting or of
perlormnnce. " Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen. 318 U.S. at 316. 63 S Ct. 604.
Instead. ve have emphasized the need for a "highly realistic" approach that recognizes
that a *contract- is 'ordinarily but an intermediate step serving to tie up prior business
negotiatio , 'ith tuture conseqt;, ,,es which themselves are the real object of the business
transa.tton "I . at 316-17. 61 ', Ct. at 604-605. It is these factors-prior negotia-
ions atd .onten'plated future consequences. along witih the terms of the contract and
the parties. actual ,ourse of dealing-that must be e'aluated in determining vhether
the dele dtant purposefull
, 
established minimum contact,, vithin the forum
hi at -179
297 'See %upra the ,ction. rribal Sosereigntv in General," and notes 48. 50. 52
and note 2,X8
298 No 85 2)4. 13 Indian L Rep 6029 (Crow, Ir Ct 19861.
299 fi at 6029-30 Hoever. the court specificalls notes that -had a letter of credit
no't been con. idercd to be independent of the underlying cotstruction contract. this court
s,,uld ha.e tound furidiction'" based on International Shoe /(/ In so holding, the court
idopted ,.axe la%. t rotr nutterou ,tate court decisions
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of the Montana test, inasmuch as they deal with the funds
necessary to complete the building of homes for tribal members,
these matters are not grounded in on-reservation activities of
the bank? 0
The court, upon finding that the IHA failed to satisfy either test,
refused to assert jurisdiction.
However, in Rosebud Housing Authority v. LaCreek Elec.ric
Power Cooperative, Inc.,", the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court found
personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff IHA's breach of contract
action against a non-Indian-owned electric cooperative doing
business on the reservation. Using the Montana test, the court
stressed that the defendant had virtually interfered with the health
and welfare of the housing unit residents, thus justifying a finding
of a consensual relationship." 2 Using the International Shoe test,
the court found that the defendant's conducting busin"sc on the
reservation constituted a "residence" within meaning of the tribal
code then in effect at the time the complaint was filed. 3 '
In this setting, both tests scrutinize the business contacts made
by the outside non-Indian defendant with the reservation IHA.
It is apparent that the tribal court may in all likelihood take
jurisdiction if the cause of action is based not only on a contractual
relationship between the parties, but sufficient other business con-
tacts as well. An interesting situation may soon arise if and when
the lawsuit involves a subcontractor on an IHA development pro-
ject, rather than the general contractor; in that case, the tribal
court would be compelled to determine jurisdiction without the
benefit of a contract.
300. Id. at 6030.
301. No. CIV-85-375, 13 Indian L. Rep. 6030 (Rbd. Sx. Tr. Ct. 1986)
302. Id. at 6031. Said the court*
Using the Montana analysis, the court concludes that it has jurisdiction to hear the
merits of the complaint. The tribe, through the Rosebud Housing Authority, administers
the public housing program through which the houses involved in this action were
built. Lack of electric service to these homes will have a direct effect on the economic
security of the tribe and its members since the lack of that kind of servi, - will reduce
the productive use of the homes by tribal members. In addition, the homes were built
to provide shelter to eligible members of the tribe, and therefore, there can be no
logical argument otherwise that the health and welfare of tribal members will be directlI
affected by the lack of electric service to these homes.
303 Id. at 6031-32.
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Conclusion
Unlike an IHA created by state law, the legal nature of a tribally
created IHA poses problems in the federal, state, and tribal courts
that must be addressed in the first instance. However, it is clear that
a tribally created IHA is not a tribal department (unless the tribal
government expressly states so in the ordinance creating the IHA)
or a federal administrative agency, but rather an arm of the tribal
government. Traditional notions of sovereign immunity also at-
tach to the actions and legal nature of a such an IHA. Both of
these factors will be taken into consideration by the respective
court in litigation involving a tribally created IHA defendant, when
the procedural issues of jurisdiction and sovereign immunity must
be addressed in advance of any determination on the merits of
the case.
Federal courts are unclear as to. whether mere enactment of
the model tribal ordinance waives the immunity of the IHA, or
whether the IHA must waive that immunity by contract. What
is clear, though, is that the issue of sovereign immunity is moot
in lawsuits arising from a construction contract entered into by
the IHA and the general contractor on the IHA development
project.
The jurisdictional issue arises only after the court determines
that sovereign immunity has been waived. The court will have
to look to the specific factual situation and the jurisdictional basis
asserted in determining whether to proceed to the merits of the
case. Tribal courts, specifically, have resorted to utilizing federal
law concerning personal jurisdiction in making this determination.
Finally, the differing applications and uses of a business contacts
test in situations involving IHAs deserves mention. The "significant
contacts" test of R. J. Williams and Duluth, founded in Montana
state law, is utilized to determine state jurisdiction by the state
court and diversity jurisdiction by the United States District Court.
The test is based on several specific factors that are scrutinized
to determine the locus of the contract dispute. The determina-
tion of the locus then determines whether the specific court may
take jurisdiction.
The purpose of the International Shoe test is to satisfy fourteenth
amendment due process requirements. Federal courts usually use
this test in conjunction with state long-arm statutes; generally,
however, tribal courts are using the minimum contacts standard
to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists with that court,
without regard to any constitutional considerations.
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As opposed to the two tests mentioned above, which look to
the degree that the IHA reaches out beyond reservation boundaries,
the Montana test looks to the business dealings of non-Indian indi-
viduals or entities encroaching on tribal affairs. This test, used
by tribal courts to determine whether they may take jurisdiction
over non-Indians, focuses on the degree of regulation tribal govern-
ments may impose upon non-Indians doing business on the
reservation.
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